

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

**Justify at any expense: How effective is Russian securitization of identity
discourse?**

Case study of Russo-Ukrainian conflict

Bachelor Thesis

Bratislava, 2020

Rosina Danilova-Cross

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Rosina Danilova-Cross

Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is the work of my own and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used academic and other sources of literature are referenced and listed in Bibliography.

Bratislava, July 15, 2020

Rosina Danilova-Cross,

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Justify at any expense: How effective is Russian securitization of identity discourse?

Case study of Russo-Ukrainian conflict

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Abstract

Throughout the course of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Russian authorities have engaged in the securitizing discourse concerning the identity of the population in Eastern Ukraine, which was necessary to justify an extraordinary measure of the annexation of Crimea. However, what remains unclear is if similar tactics of securitizing are effective regarding the Donbas region, which is to this day engaged in military conflict. This research attempts to analyze the effectivity of securitization of identity concerning Crimea and Donbas, through the use of securitization theory of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, as well as discourse analysis of communication between securitizing actor – Vladimir Putin and audience – population of Russian Federation. The conclusion of the research suggests that in the case of Crimea, the securitization discourse has been successful in the instances of the audience accepting the historical unity of the peoples as well as the threat to their desire for self-preservation. The only instance, in which the securitization has not been successful was convincing the audience, that the Russian government has not been behind the Referendum for the accession of Crimea. In the case of Donbas discourse has been less

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successful due to factors including the absence of concrete proposed extraordinary measure to which the audience could react, the diminished use of cultural similarities in the securitizing discourse, as well as reluctance of the audience to approve of supporting DPR and LPR due to domestic issues stemming from the impact of economic sanctions on Russia, falling oil prices, the collapse of the ruble, inconsistency of securitizing discourse, fear of destabilization in the region as well as the possibility of further retaliatory measures by the West. The findings of this research can assist in future exploration of identity narratives within political discourse and identify tactics used by the Russian Federation for securitizing identity in CIS countries.

Justify at any expense: How effective is Russian securitization of identity discourse?

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Abstrakt

Počas Rusko-Ukrajinského konfliktu sa Ruské orgány zapojili do sekuritizačného diskurzu týkajúceho sa identity obyvateľstva na východnej Ukrajine, čo bolo potrebné na odôvodnenie mimoriadneho opatrenia anexie Krymu. Zostáva však nejasné, či sú podobné taktiky sekuritizácie účinné v súvislosti s regiónom Donbas, ktorý sa dodnes zúčastňuje vojenského konfliktu. Tento výskum sa snaží analyzovať efektívnosť sekuritizácie identity týkajúce sa Krimu a Donbasu, pomocou teórie sekuritizácie od Barryho Buzana, Ole Wævera a Jaap Wildea, a taktiež analýzi diskurzu komunikácie medzi sekuritizačným aktérom Vladimirom Putinom a jeho publikom populácie Ruskej Federácie. Záver výskumu naznačuje, že v prípade Krymu diskurza sekuritizácie bola úspešná v prípadoch keď publikom akceptovalo historickú jednotu ľudí a taktiež pri hrozbe k ich túžbe sebazáchovy. Jediný prípad, pri ktorom sekuritizácia nebola úspešná bolo pri snahe presvedčiť publikum, že Ruská vláda nebola za Referendom pre anexiou Krymu. V prípade

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diskurzu o Donbase, sekuritizácia bola menej úspešná kvôli faktorom ako absencia konkrétnych navrhovaných mimoriadnych opatrení ku ktorým publikom môže reagovať, znížené využívanie kultúrnych podobností v sekuritizačnom diskurze a taktiež neochota publika schváliť podporu DĽR a LLR z dôvodu domácich problémov od vplyvu hospodárskych sankcií na Rusko, klesajúce ceny ropy, kolaps rubľa, nejednotnosť sekuritizačného diskurzu, strach z destabilizácie v regióne, ako aj možnosť ďalších odvetných opatrení zo strany Západu. Zistenia tohto výskumu môžu pomôcť pri budúcom skúmaní príbehov o identite v rámci politického diskurzu a identifikovať taktiku, ktorú Ruská federácia používa na sekuritizáciu identity v krajinách SNŠ.

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Introduction

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent establishment of newly independent states, Russian Federation has been consistently suspected to engage in the expansionist foreign policy aimed at regaining its former territories and influence. One of the examples that amplified this view was the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation between February and March 2014, and the subsequent armed conflict in the Donbas region within Eastern Ukraine. During the course of the conflict, the Russian Federation has engaged in the securitizing discourse involving identities of the population in the abovementioned regions. We suspect that identity discourse was one of the most effective tactics to be implemented by Russian authorities since it allowed for the extraordinary measure of the annexation of Crimea to be implemented with the support of the Russian Federation's population. However, the armed conflict in the Donbas region continues to this day, and it remains unclear if the securitizing discourse led by Russian authorities is more or less effective in comparison to the one used concerning Crimea. This research will analyze the effectivity of securitizing discourse concerning the identity of the population in Crimea and Donbas and attempt to establish the main spheres of threat perceived by Russia that lead it to securitization, as well as the most successful ways it can do so within identity discourse. The research is going to utilize the theoretical framework of securitization by Barry Buzan to establish definitions, actors, and sectors of analysis, as well as discourse analysis, which provides for a methodology of analyzing documents containing securitizing acts and audience response. The combination of these two frameworks will help prove our hypotheses:

1. The main perceived threats to Russian Federation include a threat to industrial security of regions close to Ukrainian border; a threat to the established value system and domestic political security by liberalization and westernization imported in Russia's sphere of influence, a threat to territorial integrity posed by a perceived expansionist attitude of EU and NATO; a threat to economic stability by uncertainty in the energy market and potential export partners; a threat to geopolitical and military regional influence by uncertain partnership agreements and a threat to political influence in the region through voluntary acceptance of different values by perceived allies. The combination of these threats prompts Russian authorities to utilize securitization discourse, as such threats are too controversial for discussion within the normal scope of politics.

2. The most successful tactics used within the securitizing discourse include a revival of the language used in WWII to demonize the interim government of Ukraine, portraying the self-determination of people in Crimea to separate or 'be saved' from Ukraine and narrating historical ties of Crimea with Russia.
3. The securitization of identity discourse regarding Crimea is successful/effective due to mass audience approval of extraordinary measure of annexation and the provided reasoning behind the approval, which includes most of the elements used in the securitizing discourse. The securitization of identity discourse concerning Donbas is less successful/effective due to the lack of specific extraordinary measure proposition in the securitizing discourse, as well as discontent of the audience with the Russian authorities as securitizing actors due to economic crisis brought on by implemented Western sanctions, the collapse of the ruble and falling oil prices.

The findings of this research can assist in future exploration of identity narratives within political discourse and identify tactics used by the Russian Federation for securitizing identity in CIS countries.

1. Background

1.1 Dynamics of foreign policy in the context of Russo-Ukrainian conflict

Attempting to understand the politics of the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine, many academics and practitioners suggest that the perceived expansionist attitude of Russia can be solely reduced to the personality of the leader in power and his political surroundings. However, such a narrow scope of analysis often misses particularly crucial factors: geopolitical situation on the continent, security threats outside and within the nation, as well as development and institutionalization of national identity. Securitization theory, used as a basis of this paper, presupposes that existential threat to an object may not correlate with the actual threat (i.e. Russian identity and values in Ukraine may be presented as being threatened, but the real reasons behind such narrative are hidden). Therefore, firstly we need to identify the actual rationale behind a narrative and extraordinary measures concerning it.

A collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a consequent loss of newly established Russian Federation's territory, economic and political power in the region. Thus, when analyzing the current direction of Russian foreign policy, many academic studies presume that this policy roots in the ruthless and uncompromising expansionist view of President Putin, who attempts to regain the territory of the lost empire. However, in disbelief of many, the direction of the foreign policy would not change drastically even if the leader were to be removed tomorrow. Why would that be, you ask? One needs to look no further than Russian history.

First and foremost, we need to understand the strategic geopolitical importance of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. The border of Russia with Ukraine spans 2,063 km by land and sea, being the longest border Russia has with its neighbors in the West. Moreover, Kyiv lies in relative proximity with the Central Federal District of Russia and Moscow itself. This region is of grave productive importance since its main specializations are chemical and oil refining industries as well as oil and coal production. It makes sense for Moscow to keep control of Ukraine's foreign policy, alliance, and bloc considerations for security reasons. However, if it is unable to do so, Russia will try to establish a security zone at its Western border. Moreover, if we look at security from a simple territorial perspective, Russian territory mainly consists of plain flats, thus being vulnerable to attacks from outside. The territorial integrity of Russia has been one of the main

considerations in Russia’s policymaking throughout the 19-20th century. However, viewing policy in the times of globalization purely from this perspective is narrow-minded.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we can trace a shift in Russian foreign policy from mere concern for a territory to a new, more sophisticated kind of threat. Kuchins and Zevelev in their analysis of influences on Russian foreign policy (Kuchins et al., 2011) see main foreign policy considerations in Russia though a prism of being shaped by three main elites: pro-western liberals, power-shifters, and nationalists. These groups have had the most profound impact on the political agenda of Moscow at the begging of the 21st century.

Table 1. Domestic groups in Russia influencing foreign policy.

Table 1: Who are the major domestic groups?

<i>Major groups</i>	<i>Important subgroups</i>	<i>Political representation</i>	<i>Influential Institutions</i>
Pro-Western liberals		Non-parliamentary parties and movements, including Yabloko; the Party of People’s Freedom and Solidarnost movement	INSOR; Liberal Mission; Carnegie Moscow Center; partly— Academy of Sciences institutions (IMEMO, ISKRAN)
Great power balancers	Former pro-Western liberals	Most of the government’s executive branch; parliamentary parties: United Russia and Just Russia	United Russia’s “clubs”; Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; The Institute for Social Forecasting; partly— MGIMO and Academy of Sciences institutions
Nationalists	Neo-imperialists; proponents of regional domination; ethnic nationalists	Parliamentary parties: CPRF and LDPR	Many independent intellectuals; Historic Perspective Foundation; Institute for the CIS Countries

Note: Reproduced from *Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change p.149*, by Andrew C. Kuchins & Igor A. Zevelev (2011)

Main shockwaves to how Moscow views foreign affairs came from the response of the Bush administration to the 9/11 attacks and the crash of oil prices. Since the main political influence of modern Russia lies within CIS countries, the concern is that imported liberal-democratic ideals and values may lead to westernization at the Russian border, causing a ripple effect on the Russian population. This means that domestic pro-western liberals would gain more power and have more ideological weapons under their belt and power-shifters may be more susceptible to such changes. (See Table 1). Therefore, if imported liberalization and westernization is successful, the whole political system within the country may crash and lead to a regime change. Thus, the Russian administration has repeatedly claimed that the post-soviet space is their primary focus within foreign policy. In short, the administration tries to keep its neighbors under control, in fear that any changes in their policy trajectories may subsequently impact domestic affairs. Attempts to encourage more integration can be seen through the participation of Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), or developing a 'Program for economic cooperation of Russian Federation and Ukraine 2011-2020' (Legislature of Ukraine, 2010), which was later scrapped by the Ukrainian government.

Regarding perceived threats to security, Russia's main concern lies within the shifting power balance on the European continent. NATO alliance and the European Union are largely considered to be main threatening political and military actors. Even though the European Union was created as an economic and political bloc in response to the events of World War II as a peace and integration project, its influence has significantly risen throughout the 20th century. In the eyes of Moscow, the European Union is a growing political powerhouse, despite its internal divisions and financial challenges. The issue lies in the aims of the European Union to extend its influence in Eastern Europe. What is even more concerning, is that the EU is largely seen as a 'trojan horse' of NATO expansion, threatening political, economic, and cultural values within Russia's sphere of influence. Such deep suspicion of bloc's intentions is not entirely ungrounded. In the recent past, the EU managed to pull Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Baltic states into its orbit, causing grave concern in Moscow. Not only did these events bring westernization closer to the Russian border, but they also allowed NATO troops to be located at the doorstep of the country, namely in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania. NATO's scope of operation includes regular air space policing, maintenance of military bases, and military drills. There have been many instances in which the presence of NATO has aggravated Russian officials, such as exercise 'Anaconda' in

Poland, which deployed 31000 personnel from member states in 2016 (NATO, 2016). The most recent move is the proposed ‘DEFENDER–Europe 20’ which is going to be the largest military drill of NATO in 25 years, deploying 37000 troops in Poland. Even though the exercise was later scaled down due to concerns posed by COVID-19 outbreak, it will still take place in June 2020 (NATO, 2020). Nevertheless, the response of Deputy President of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences Konstantin Sivkov is representative of Kremlin’s point of view:

‘There are no fools in the USA and Europe. They are not suicidal to attack Russia, which can respond. These drills are held for the sole purpose of creating inner turmoil. NATO is setting a stage for itself, hoping that someday our country will lose control over its arms control system. They want to ‘probe’ our borders. That is why they conduct these drills. In my opinion, ‘Operation Defender-2020’ can be seen as a provocation against Russia. This is real preparation for military operations. The US plans to disorganize our country from within’ (Sivkov, 2020)¹

It is then particularly important to note that if the EU increases its cooperation with Ukraine, NATO may soon be on the way, threatening Russian borders and influence just as it did with other countries. Finally, the advancement of technology and military capabilities across the world meant that any installations, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or ballistic missile defense systems, became more precise and deadly. Therefore, Russia underlines that adopting these technologies on the borders with Russia gives NATO an unfair strategic advantage, undermines the regional and global system, and therefore, needs extreme measures to be tackled with.

Another threat to Russian political influence may stem from economic concerns. Ukraine is considered the main strategic ground for export and transition of Russian gas into European union, with 38, 500 km of pipelines consisting of several corridors. As of 2018, Russian Gazprom PJSC exported 87 billion cubic meters (more than 40% of its exports) to Western Europe and

¹ Ershova, A. (2020, February 28). *"Защитник-2020": как учения НАТО в Восточной Европе повлияют на Россию* [“Defender-2020”: How NATO exercises in Eastern Europe will affect Russia]. Retrieved from <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/25522>

Turkey via the pipeline network run by Ukraine's Naftogaz JSC. Even though other gas transits into Europe, such as Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream, are in various stages of development, most of the gas still flows through Ukraine reaching Slovakia, Belarus, and Hungary and from there other European states (Khrennikova et al., 2019). A threat to the security of this gas cooperation lies in the fact that European countries are stockpiling gas and other sources of energy are increasingly becoming available. Economically beneficial contracts with Ukraine are extremely important, as exploitation of Nord Stream 2 is still halted by negotiations and Russia desperately needs to support its fragile economy with income from exports. Above that, Ukraine is important as a trading partner, since the annual profit from such exports can be as high as USD 20b in 2011, with the main exports being chemicals, steel, and machinery (Trading Economics, 2020). Even though these industries are important to Russia, there needs to be mention that Ukraine is one of the largest markets for other products that may not be exported to European nations due to strict quality and safety regulations. Since the annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in Donbas, Russian exports to Ukraine have steadily declined and if Ukraine improves its economic and political cooperation with the EU, Russia will lose a large part of its export market that is hard to replace.

Lastly, the Russian government is heavily invested in maintaining its geopolitical presence in the sea region, making the Crimean Peninsula, as well as Kerch Strait and Azov Sea one of its main bases for naval operations. Keeping in mind that the Crimean Peninsula was a part of Ukraine before its annexation, Russia had to annually lease the naval installations from Ukraine to support operations of the Black Sea Fleet. The original deal for the lease of Sevastopol base was set to expire in 2017 until President Medvedev and President Yanukovich agreed to prolong the deal until 2042 in exchange for a discount on gas price and additional risk security discounts for Ukraine. However, such an agreement proved too costly for Russia, namely costing USD 40b in addition to preexisting Ukrainian debt (Harding, 2010). Therefore, when the Maidan Revolution has occurred in Ukraine and President Yanukovich fled the country, the Russian government noted the threat to Moscow's political influence, prompting them to impose an extraordinary measure of annexing peninsula and one-sidedly canceling the trade agreement. In rebuttal, Ukraine has taken Russia to court for violating Kharkiv Pact (Legislature of Ukraine, 2010) and demanded retributions.

When analyzing the actions of the Russian Federation regarding Ukraine, mass media and research tend to note the Maidan Revolution as a decisive factor in Moscow's decision to annex Crimea. President Yanukovich, being the winner of the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine, was widely considered pro-Russian and maintained close economic and political ties with Moscow. He was the embodiment of stark contrast to his predecessor – Victor Yushchenko. Yushchenko vouched to sever ties with the Russian Federation, claiming that it is a destabilizing factor in Eastern Ukraine with its naval and ideological presence. The Maidan Revolution, which started in November 2013 aimed to counter the 'widespread government corruption', 'violation of human rights' and 'abuse of power'. The last straw for protesters was the scrapping of the 'Ukraine – European Union Association Agreement' (European Commission, 2013), which would have increased the economic and political cooperation of Ukraine with the West, as well as prepare it for possible future integration. Yanukovich attempted to justify his decision by stating that while Ukraine still pursued continued cooperation with Europe, it did not want to cut economic ties with Russia. In a way, such a decision was somewhat justifiable, as reforms required by the European Union within the scope of the agreement were extremely costly and would hit the struggling Ukrainian economy where it hurts. However, it is not our place to speculate on Yanukovich's political decisions, but note that they were taken in spikes by Maidan Square protestors, leading to the signing of 'Agreement on settlement of the political crisis in Ukraine' and the subsequent fleeing of Yanukovich abroad. However, we dare to suggest that it was not the Maidan itself that has caused extraordinary annexation of Crimea and subsequent military interventions in the Donbas region. What threatened Moscow most was the deliberation with which the newly established Zelenskyj government pursued cooperation and integration with the European Union. The threat to the economic, political, military, ideological, value and identity influence that Russia had over Ukraine was too big to be left unnoticed.

To summarize this section, the securitizing discourse presents an existential threat to an object or value, that needs immediate attention and justifies the deployment of extraordinary measure, that would not be possible under normal political circumstances. However, the real threats to another object are masked by this discourse. This section presents several threats and objects perceived by Russia that may require the need for securitizing discourse:

1. A threat to industrial security of regions close to Ukrainian border
2. A threat to the established value system and domestic political security by liberalization and westernization imported in Russia's sphere of influence
3. A threat to territorial integrity posed by a perceived expansionist attitude of EU and NATO
4. A threat to economic stability by uncertainty in the energy market and potential export partners
5. A threat to geopolitical and military regional influence by uncertain partnership agreements
6. A threat to political influence in the region through voluntary acceptance of different values by perceived allies

As we can see, the common denominator in these threat factors is Ukraine, thus the securitizing discourse should be narrated in such a way, that can justify extraordinary measures concerning it. From here we can explore how leadership in Russia plays an important role in constructing securitizing discourse and why identity discourse is preferred to do so.

1.2 Power and instability: Why securitize identity discourse?

To further explore which political actor would most suitable to securitize narrative discourse, we need to understand the nature of the Russian political system. One would ask, why wouldn't it be possible to analyze securitizing discourse from the standpoint of several elites in place of power instead of just the leader? Such reasoning stems from the opacity of power in Russia and the role of a patron-client system in politics.

To proceed with our research, we need to establish what is understood by the concept of 'power'. The category of power is one of the key categories in the theory of International Relations, something that ensures the dynamics of international processes. In constructivism, which guides our analysis, 'power' implies not so much the use of direct physical force, as the ability to build relationships and create the opportunity to consolidate, objectify desired representations of the international environment, affecting the motivation, identity and behavior of other actors (Guzzini, 2013, p. 230).

In any country businesses always attempt to influence political decisions. A patronage system involves an administrative dictatorship of power over business, which is well established in Russia. The authoritarian party regime's logic lies in the representation of the powerful group's interests. The need of the ruling party to acquire steady revenue forces it to find new ways to create legislative channels for interest representation of groups supporting them. The ruling party, 'United Russia', led by Putin, has steadily gained control over State Duma since the collapse of the USSR. Some of the key factors allowing it to do so are presented in the research on 'President-Parliament relations under Vladimir Putin' by Thomas Remington (Remington, 2008). Remington suggests that major changes in legislature and patronage channels within the Duma have occurred by adding more legislative committees, through which 'United Russia' could multiply patronage channels in policy areas. This meant that with more jurisdictions and committees added by each Duma, the prospect of conflict over resources decreased. However, it may have also added clients within them, putting pressure on 'United Russia'. For example, Remington states, that "despite assurances by the party before the Fifth Duma convened that it would reduce the number of committees, it increased them from 29 to 32" (Remington, 2008, p.961). Moreover, Remington states that the implementation of structural changes within the Duma helped eliminate opposing faction's deputy groups and diversify patronage channels within the main party itself. Remington notes that "in the Fourth Convocation, the deputies raised the threshold needed to register deputy groups from 35 to 55" (Remington, 2008, p.965). While the opposition was slowly being eliminated, United Russia could allocate separate channels for each deputy group within the party faction, allowing it to serve specific interest groups. Therefore, enormous pressure to represent specific interests lies on the shoulders of the main political party, with Vladimir Putin in charge. And if there are issues, such as those described in the previous section, that threaten powerful group's/client's interest, it is the responsibility of 'United Russia' and, in turn, Vladimir Putin to resolve it or, in our case, securitize something else.

Such a semi-formal patronage system has been in place long before the establishment of the Russian Federation or even the Soviet Union. Even though the Soviet system was based on the abstract patron-client system between Moscow and its satellite states, the remnants of a more traditional informal patronage system from the Russian Empire remained in place. Here we can turn to an opaque connection between leaders in power within Russia and those in former Soviet Union states. It comes as nothing new, that most of the individuals within the elite surrounding

Vladimir Putin come from a similar educational and career background, such as a Committee for State Security (KGB) and Federal Security Service (FSB). Thus, when interacting within a patron-client system, their exchanges will be more personalistic in nature, rather than institutional. Within the scope of our research, similar interactions take place between elites within post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine. Such networks are deeply rooted in the system and even the younger generation of politicians/businessmen are connected through ties established by their predecessors. Therefore, when specific interests of individuals regarding Ukraine are under threat, a leader may have a personal stake in resolving them. For example, Putin made certain that Alexey Miller, a long term ally, secured a position as CEO at energy giant Gazprom in 2002, ensuring that some of Gazprom's executives would not engage in any third-party agreements harmful to political and economic interests of government (Gazprom-Media, 2020). In turn, when Gazprom suffered huge losses due to prolongation of the Sevastopol Naval Base agreement, Putin had a personal stake in eliminating the threat to Miller's interests, by implementing securitizing discourse. This is, by far, not the only reason securitization was required but highlights how personal relations make Putin the main actor to lead the discourse.

Now that we have established main reasons, or threats, behind the securitizing discourse and actors producing it, we need to understand why securitization was spun around the issue of identity, presenting it as being threatened and requiring extraordinary measures to eliminate the threat. In the theory of securitization, the audience plays a key role in the success of securitizing discourse, therefore identity discourse should be directed at individuals, with who's blessings one could implement actions out of the normal scope of politics. It is important to keep in mind that identity is not static, but intersubjective and modifiable by day-to-day interactions. Some of the clearest ways to build collective identities are experiences within a given culture or other individuals in society (Lanehart, 1996). Therefore, collective identity can be reshaped and adjusted. The easiest way to shape identity is by referring to cultural and social aspects rooted in the collective mind since with personal and collective memory people become attached to it.

Even though Russia has employed a balance of soft and hard power concerning annexation of Crimea, such as the use of protesters, presence of naval fleet on the peninsula, as well as intelligence services, identity discourse became a decisive factor in persuading the audience that Russia's involvement in Crimea was of dire importance. Here we will argue that official identity discourse coming out of Kremlin was based on three factors: revival of the collective identity of

WWII to create ‘self-other’ dichotomy between Moscow and Kyiv through language, portraying self-determination of people in Crimea to separate from the illegitimate Ukrainian government and narrating historical ties of Crimea with Russia.

Moscow used a narrative, which suggested that people in Crimea were not supportive of the government in Ukraine. This was done through the language used to describe ‘others’/enemies during WWII. For example, speeches, presented by Vladimir Putin, suggest that the interim government, described as a fascist ‘junta’, overthrew a legitimate government of Yanukovich. In several addresses to the nation, Putin suggests that lawmakers, present at Strasbourg talks ‘themselves supplied the bandits with money and weapons, spoke out at rallies against legitimate authorities, ‘heated’ the radicals, and at the same time theatrically distributed cookies to them’ (Putin, 2014a). Putin states that ‘state bodies are usurped by impostors, that do not control anything in the country, and they themselves ... are under the control of radicals’, further demonizing the Ukrainian interim government (Putin, 2014b). Logically, the Russian-speaking population of Crimea was in danger of events, happening in Kyiv, therefore the use of Russian special forces present in Crimea was needed to ensure a peaceful referendum of Independence. Moreover, Russia itself was in danger, as terms, such as ‘fascists’, ‘Banderas’ or ‘bandits’ used to describe interim government strongly resonate with the Russian population, whom themselves fought in the ‘Great Patriotic War’ – a term used to describe WWII in Russia. Stating that Western governments were supporting protesters in Kyiv plays strongly into a securitizing narrative. In the minds of Russians, it brings up memories of fascist Germany and its allies, who portrayed themselves as superior to other Slavic nations and their identities. In the cultural memory of the Russian population, they were the ones that saved the European continent from horrors of fascist Germany, therefore Western nations, who were ‘supporting fascists in Ukraine’ presented a danger and grave historical injustice. The hatred towards the West is further exaggerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is partially blamed on Western forces. Lastly, Sevastopol was awarded the title of ‘hero city’ during the Soviet Union, as it was fought for and liberated by the Red Army. Therefore, a perceived attempt to take away the freedoms of Russian-speaking ‘brothers’ in the East of Ukraine was taken personally and played well into Moscow’s narrative.

Another narrative used as a pretext for annexation consists of historical ties of Crimea to Russia. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1786-1774, the Russian army has conquered Crimea and stationed itself there. Later, as a prerequisite of a peace treaty signed between Russians and Turks

in 1774, the Russian Empire gained the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait. Under the ‘Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca’ (Rumyantsev et al., 1774), Crimean Khanate regained a full ‘freedom’ from Ottoman or Russian influence and subsequently territory of Crimea. However, since the peninsula was surrounded by Russian guilds and was cut off from other Islamic states by sea, it nevertheless was influenced by Russian Empire, and not long after was taken over by Russian Army and became a part of the Empire in 1783. Lastly since the threat of raids from Crimean Khanate, now being a part of the Russian Empire, disappeared, Empress of Russia Catherine the Great disbanded the Zaporizhian Sich which led to the creation of Novorossiia – ‘New Russia’, containing Crimea. In one of the most important addresses given by Putin to the Russian Parliament on the annexation of Crimea, Putin states that ‘in the heart and minds of people, Crimea has always been and remains an integral part of Russia. This conviction, based on truth and justice, was unshakable’ (Putin, 2014b). Therefore, the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation invokes a collective memory of Russia’s imperial past. Moreover, the revival of the term ‘Novorossiia’ into political discourse, makes the ‘reunification’ of Russia with Crimea historically just and omission of Crimean history before the Russo-Turkish War necessary for securitization.

In this section, we have discovered that reasons for securitizing discourse concerning Ukraine stem from perceived threatening factors, such as various threats to the economic, political, geopolitical, ideological, military influence of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Moreover, we have established that the political party ‘United Russia’ and President Vladimir Putin would be the main securitizing actors in need to push a discourse. The reason behind such a conclusion is enormous pressure originating from powerful interest groups or individuals within the patron-client system in the Russian Federation and ex-Soviet countries. Vladimir Putin would be further encouraged to protect individual interests as he is connected to powerful people through a set of well-established patronage channels remaining in place from the times of the USSR. Lastly, we established, that identity discourse was chosen for securitization, since collective identity is intersubjective and can be modifiable by social interaction, especially with the use of cultural and social aspects rooted in the collective mind. In the case of Ukraine, the main aspects of identity securitization included a revival of the language used in WWII to demonize the interim government of Ukraine, portraying the self-determination of people in Crimea to separate or ‘be saved’ from Ukraine and narrating historical ties of Crimea with Russia.

However, several questions are left unanswered in the preliminary research within the context of Russo-Ukrainian conflict, namely:

1. Was the securitization of identity discourse successful or not?
2. What kind of language/theme makes identity discourse successful?

We can, preliminarily, argue that the original securitization discourse was successful since an extraordinary measure of annexing Crimea was implemented and was supported by the audience. However, the war in the East of Ukraine, mainly the Donbas area, continues to this day. Thus, it is important to understand, what kind of language Moscow uses to justify the need to prolong the conflict and whether it is accepted by Russia's population.

2. Structure of identity discourse analysis via securitization theory

This chapter brings in the theoretical background for directing a discourse analysis to extract findings on the effectivity of the Russian state in securitizing identity narrative within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The theoretical backbone of this chapter is based on the provision and explanation of securitization theory developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et al., 1998).

2.1 Relationship between identity and security

Since the collapse of the bipolar world system, a new paradigm of international cooperation has been established. Radical global order changes that have occurred in the 1980 -1990s, such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, collapse of the socialist wing and a relative cessation of confrontation between West and East, have led to a change in the concepts of power and security.

For the major part of the 20th-century Security Studies have been synonymous with strategic studies with a marked focus on the military sector. However, with the emergence of newly independent states, number and strength of political actors, as well as the models of their behavior and interaction, the traditional realist view of the sole concept of security, that is, its essence, has become too narrow.

To get the needed insight into those changes it is crucial to identify what is meant by the concept of 'security'. Establishing characteristics of this concept also denotes a logical priority for this thesis, since, without an explicit and clear definition of its content and scope, it is unfeasible to conduct security analysis and practical observations within it. Barry Buzan's, Ole Wæver's and Jaap de Wilde's definition of security clearly state that security is a "pursuit of freedom from threats" (Buzan, 1991, p. 18), however, the content of this concept remains largely unclear. Therefore, we will supply this definition with the additional concept of power from a constructivist approach, ensuring that security is entangled in the dynamics of international processes. In constructivism 'power' implies not so much the use of direct physical strength, as the ability to build relationships and create the opportunity to consolidate, objectify desired representations of the international environment, affecting the motivation, identity and behavior of other actors (Guzzini, 2013, p. 230).

Now, at the junction of millennia, the key concept of characterizing the processes of world order is globalization. The essence of this process lies in strengthening the interconnectedness and interdependence of states and peoples. The phenomenon of globalization goes beyond a purely economic and military framework and covers almost all spheres of social activity, including culture and identity. Therefore, when characterizing the main features of the modern global international system, we need to remember that a nation-state remains a main actor in the international arena and continues to be the primary subject of international law. State, through its foreign policy, seeks to protect national interests, preserve territorial integrity, and ensure security. However, global interconnectedness has led to a realization of the fact, that neither the economic strength, military power, geopolitical stance, or territorial might can answer acute problems of the modern society. Nowadays, new dimensions, such as the ability of the population to protect the political and social system increasingly determine the power and status of the state. Thus, the security of state integrity and power regarding these dimensions can be seen as crucial elements of the national agenda and foreign policy.

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, as representatives of the Copenhagen School of International Relations, prefer a constructivist method in their analysis of the international system. They depart from the tradition of realism which operates on the premise that approach to security is reduced plainly to the struggle for power. They state that security issues now must be monitored at the appropriate levels and sectors (Buzan et al., 1998, p.5-8). Three basic levels of security are mentioned: individuals, states, international systems. But the focus of their analysis is precisely the sectors. The security concept is not a model where you can apply the same approach in any situation, at any level or sector. The task is to isolate each sector to analyze security dynamics, but at the same time, see all sectors as being a part of the interconnected network.

The authors mention several sectors in their model, including military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Threats to security in the social sector are associated with society as a whole and the identity of the people who make it up (Buzan et al., 1998, pp.119-120, p.123). National identity determines a person's belonging to a nation as a political community. The legitimacy of the government and the state as an institution is built on this base, aiming at the realization of national identity in political actions under the guise of preserving national interests. Thus, identity politics are implemented in the context of power relations, domination, and submission, competition, and cooperation.

This is why all kinds of states are pursuing certain identity policies aimed at integrating the national community, forming a certain idea of a ‘nation’ based on certain interpretations of ‘national’ history and culture. Each state tries to convince its citizens that they constitute a ‘nation’, therefore, all together belong to one political community and have special obligations concerning fellow citizens and to a state common to all of them. Such policy may be turned to or intensified if other sectors of security are weak or threatened or are too controversial in the context of policymaking to be dealt with heads on.

2.2 Nation-state and identity politics

The term ‘identity politics’, established in 1960-1970s as part of the constructivist paradigm of analysis of socio-political changes on the wave of the rise of mass social movements for the rights of discriminated social groups, was originally used in the meaning of practice affirmation of minorities and groups that are impaired in their social status, uniting as carriers of a special identity (racial, ethnic, gender), the right to public recognition and legitimacy. At the same time, the subjects of identity policy were new social movements. (Bourdieu, P, 1992, p.121). In this regard, in Western countries, the concept of ‘identity politics’ primarily characterizes the processes of consolidation of unprivileged or self-infringing groups, their self-determination in the national political community, and opposition to the homogenizing and centralizing claims of the nation-state. However, the state is still a key actor in the policy of identity, which, through the education system, media and instruments of public policy, is constantly involved in the process of promoting a common language, a sense of common membership in social institutions operating in that language, and equal access to them – ‘nation-building’. This is done to disseminate a certain national identity based on participation in this societal culture.

Ways of interpreting the differences in which identity is ‘built’ are defined and supported by categorizing and identifying individuals and groups by the state, media discourses, the educational system, and political movements. Moreover, success or failure in the production of common national identity and agenda for those who rule and those who are being ruled, the formation of a common view of the world and a common system of concepts and meanings strengthens or destroys existing order. Thus, people’s identities are not theirs uniquely but are constructed and redefined by their environment, and above all, they are the result of subjection to a certain type of discourse as a form of power (Foucault, M, 1975, pp. 622-636)

The result of an identity policy is the individual's acceptance of those attitudes, stereotypes and value orientations that elites in power are trying to disperse: in this sense, political socialization is an extremely important process in which the individual dives into the discursive field of traditions, symbols, narratives, etc. that give him an idea of the state as a community and its position in it. Therefore, the identity policy can be constructed through forming a public discourse of the nation through language or culture, the establishment of ethnic group status and their territorial allocation, construction and re-construction of the symbolic policy and representation of nation-state image on the international arena.

2.3 Analyzing security

According to the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes, the state emerged as a result of a desire to have security and protection within a community, thus the existence of the state and its legitimacy are justified as means to provide for those needs (Hobbes, 1968). However, since the individual, society, and the international system along with the state began to be considered as equal objects of international security policy in the 1990s, the problem of security has expanded.

A narrow state-centric realist understanding of security, focused solely on the military factors, has diminished the ability of security studies discipline to discover and expand the essence of global order. Moreover, questions, intertwined with the sociological theory, came into the field of view, since social order is arranged differently regarding the natural order of material reality. The gradual distancing of the field from positivism (which notes that empiricist observation of the natural sciences can be applied to the social sciences) in the field of International Relations, i.e. in the frame of constructivism, theoreticians started to implement the concept of the social construction of reality. Due to the emergence of such ideas in the theories of International Relations, the idea that the social order can be an object, which includes the domestic sphere in itself no less than international, and intrasocial process no less than social, became more apparent. The understanding of different concepts required an analysis, capable of deconstruction and investigation of social practices, hidden by positivist objectivism. Criticism of the predominantly positivist approach was aimed at understanding how actors construct their relationships and how they are involved in creating the world in which they exist. Security and insecurity, for this approach, are relative qualities, and not the material distribution of opportunities, threats, and vulnerabilities.

In this sense, Barry Buzan's, Ole Wæver's and Jaap de Wilde's securitization theory is a useful tool for security analysis, as it utilizes a wide variety of different theories and the tools they offer, as well as the level and sectoral approach, which allows it to expand the security analysis that existed before and provide an understanding of its complexity, applying the structured scheme to modern problems of International Relations.

However, it is important to note, that the concept of 'security' in securitization theory does not reflect its objective characteristics, since the problem isn't exactly a threat at all because it "actually is" is an existential security problem (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). It can be said that participants in the political process themselves determine what is meant by 'security', and therefore it seems to be a subjective phenomenon. Therefore, security, from a concept describing the behavior of states, has turned into a linguistic representation interpreted from a linguistic choice of political actors and texts produced by them.

2.4 Securitization theory framework

The concept of securitization theory is predominantly located on the intersection of realism and constructivism, which has been started by the English School; however, the theory itself is often noted simply as a development of Copenhagen School. Buzan's, Wæver's and de Wilde's concepts are developed on the premise that disciplines are more often than not intertwined, and that International Relations cannot be considered as a separate discipline, but a multidisciplinary field, offering a more inclusive conceptualization of International Relations (Albert & Buzan, 2018). Such a multi-level, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach allows for a more in-depth understanding of who is being threatened, who is responsible for creating an illusion of threat, why it is done, and how it affects the target audience.

For Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, securitization is a process, in which a given object is presented as a problem of security. An understanding of the security is always connected with the issue of survival, therefore with the issue of survival of this object. Authors introduce their conceptual apparatus with the term of referent object, which is defined as an object concerning which there is a perceived existential threat – an object or a subject that poses an immediate threat regarding it (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36). Often this existential threat is externalized. An externalization of threat is a political move in which the threat to security, according to a securitizing agent (politician or individual), comes from a source outside of the country, instead of

from within it. An example in which the focus of politicians shifts from domestic issues, such as economic crisis, on external, such as a threat to national identity in another country, is a characteristic example of threat externalization. Thus, an object, such as national identity, becomes a security issue, since a decision that it is more important than other objects is made, and it needs to become an absolute priority. Therefore, you can point at that object and say that it needs to survive, and therefore one needs to implement an extraordinary measure for that to happen (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36). And if drastic and extraordinary measures are not promptly implemented - everything else will lose its point, as the state and society will cease to exist in its current state.

Theoretically, any issue can be located within a continuum, starting from non-politicized, where the government of securitizing actor does not deal with the issue and it does not become a part of political discourse; through politicized, where an issue becomes a part of political discourse and needs to be resolved; to securitization, where the issue is presented as an existential threat in need of urgent extraordinary measures that justify actions beyond the scope of normal political procedure. Thus, securitization is an extreme version of politicization.

Extraordinary measures are important within the framework of securitization theory, as such measures often limit liberal-democratic citizens and human rights within given nations. Even if the nation is not democratic as such, but pursues to present itself as one, extraordinary measures can only be implemented if there are a legitimization and acceptance that security threat exists. In other words, this is a desperate attempt to take an object out of the normal political sphere and give it a status of extreme importance. Thus, securitization takes us out of the norms of standard politics, and 'security' is a move that lifts politics above-set rules of resolving issues and set norms.

For securitization to take place, one needs to consider the actors that execute it, persuading the audience that the referent object is existentially threatened. A securitizing agent is a subject (which can be an individual or a group) that produces a speech act concerning security. In most cases this role is taken on by the government, politician, political opposition, or a pressure group (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36, p.40). However, there are many more examples of agents outside of government actors, such as NGOs, individuals, or groups that are not connected to politics whatsoever.

During the process of securitization, there needs to be an assertion that the threat to the referent object has come into sight. Thus, a politician, as a securitizing actor, may state that the collective identity or values of its state national abroad have been existentially threatened by

conflicting or opposing values imposed on them by something/somebody else. This identity, as a referent object, is essential for the survival of the state and social order, in need of immediate extraordinary measures to save it.

Moreover, for securitization to be successful, the securitizing actor needs to successfully persuade the audience that the posed issue is existential. It is crucial to note that the speech act needs to be accepted by the target audience, otherwise such an attempt would only be a securitizing move, and not successful securitization (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25). For example, if the military invasion or an imposed martial law has been accepted by the target audience, the securitization has been successful. On the other hand, if securitizing policy discourse is not reflected in the actual policy considerations, such an attempt could only be called a securitizing move. There are many ways to measure the response of the audience, such as political and social opinion poll data, news media reports, or policy implementation, however concrete measurements depend on the context of securitization.

It is especially important to understand that there is a delicate balance in the securitizing system. For example, apart from the securitizing agent that tries to present something as an existential threat regarding the referent object and the target audience, we need to consider functional actors, that are influencing the system but are not agents or audience themselves (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36). Moreover, such actors can take on several roles at the same time: an actor, such as European Union, may be seen as threatening Slavic identity – being an existential threat; or a functional actor – a Union that can enter system already in the process of securitizing with economic sanctions as a coercive punitive mechanism. Therefore, the analysis of securitization should consider the context and relevant players within it.

Within the context of Buzan's, Wæver's, and de Wilde's analytical framework, we need to establish who is trying to persuade the target audience that an existential threat exists, what is being threatened, what is the threat, and for what purpose is securitization needed. Here we argue that Vladimir Putin, being a securitizing agent, is trying to persuade population in Russian Federation, being an audience, that Russian/Pan-Slavic identity of people in Eastern Ukraine, being referent object, is threatened by imported Western identity and ideals, which are being pushed by newly established Ukrainian Government. This is done to implement extraordinary measures of a) annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, b) justifying support for pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, c) destabilizing political establishment in Kyiv to regain Moscow's sphere of influence.

We are suggesting that Vladimir Putin, as a leader of ‘United Russia’ party, wants to see Russia’s population explicitly supporting the idea, that Pan-Slavic identity is of dire importance to the survival of Russians as a nation and acknowledging that if they do not, the established power and might of Russia would subside or even become non-existent. We might argue that support for such discourse has been partially successful since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has been widely accepted, with 86% of Russia’s population supporting the reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation and 70% stating that reunification mostly helped Russia as of March 2018 (Levada-Center, 2018). However, we might not see such resonance in case of war in Donbas, since Russian government cannot directly send its troops in Eastern Ukrainian territory, but only use a discourse, suggesting that they somewhat support actions of a pro-Russian militia. However, there still might be some semblance of successful securitization in this instance, as a prerequisite of success can require only “enough resonance from a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25).

2.4.1 Levels of analysis

For analysis purposes, we need to understand what kind of actors are present in the securitizing discourse. By doing so, we can set the margins of actors’ influence on the audience and other agents in the process. Determining actors helps us place them on a specific level of analysis and helps identify a more complex structure of interactions within the system. Here we can present specific actors and their scope of influence according to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde within levels of analysis (Buzan et al., 2000). An institutional dimension is divided into several groups:

1. International systems - an overarching term for all institutions, that do not have a higher level of interaction.
2. International subsystems - groups of units within an international system, distinguished by their nature and intensity of interaction/interdependence.
3. Units - entities composed of subgroups, organizations, communities, individuals that can act as actors and be represented by higher units.
4. Subunits - organized groups within units, that can influence individuals.
5. Individuals – lowest units of analysis.

For each of these dimensions, the scope of their influence is presented within our research context (See Table 2).

Table 2. Levels of analysis

<i>Level of analysis</i>	<i>International Systems</i>	<i>International Subsystems</i>	<i>Units</i>	<i>Subunits</i>	<i>Individual units</i>
<i>Actor</i>	The global political community, International society, United Nations, International Court of Justice	European Union (EU), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), BRICS, OPEC, NATO	Russian Federation, Ukraine, EU member states	Communities within units (i.e. private/public pressure groups, political opposition, militia, etc.)	Population or individuals within units
<i>Scope</i>	Globalized international community	Regional economic and political communities	Nation-states	Actors, that may put pressure, inform, or shape decisions of units	Individuals

Note: Interpreted levels of analysis based on the framework in *Security - A New Framework For Analysis*, by Buzan B., et al (1998)

Using distinctions presented in the table we can now analyze relationships of each actor within the context of Russo-Ukrainian conflict. For example, the Russian Federation uses different approaches to actors within the system depending on the context. When presenting an existential threat of liberalization and westernization, Russia as an institutional unit, often does not deal with the other fellow units, such as specific countries. Instead, it presents the EU, NATO, or the West in general as sources of threat. Dealing with a threat on the level of international systems and subsystems is more important for securitization, as it bulks up different issues and presents them

as one coherent threat. On the other hand, the government of Ukraine uses different channels to fight against the attacks from Russia. It may interact with international systems and international subsystems, such as ICJ, UN or EU, that could impose sanctions on specific subunits within Russia, such as powerful individuals (Sen. Cardin, 2016), or Russia as a unit, by taking it to court (ICJ, 2020). Therefore, we can see that a mismatch in pressuring strategies can create an issue for Russian Federation, as the international community is swifter in implementing punitive mechanisms, which may halt acceptance of securitizing discourse by affecting the economy and creating discontent of the population with the government.

2.4.2 Sectors of analysis

In their analysis, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde outline several sectors of security: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. They state that “military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.7). The use of sectors, individually or combined, identifies possible objects of securitization, with any of them being of a higher priority. Sectors, or referent objects, do not exist in a vacuum, but inherently constitute parts of a complex whole. In the scope of our analysis, political and societal sectors are of higher importance than others because our research is concerned with identity discourse and preservation of political stability.

Since the government itself constitutes a political unity, the possibility of weakening this unity will be perceived as an existential threat. In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally related to the principle of sovereignty and are constituted of anything that can delegitimize norms, rules, and institutions within a unit or sphere. As we have mentioned earlier, imported liberalization and westernization within Russia’s sphere of influence can subsequently be transferred into the domestic environment, strengthening opposition, pro-western liberals, and great power balancers, causing loss of control over domestic politics and threat of regime change. This sector would be crucial in our analysis since political security is the main reason for securitization discourse.

Threats in the societal sector concern the people and their identities. Referent objects in this sector are mainly collective identities. In the case of Russo-Ukrainian conflict the threat to social security, with the ability to produce traditional forms of Russian language, associations, culture, and national identities, is also coming from liberalization and westernization. Moscow's narrative tries to portray an inevitable clash between western and pan-Slavic identities, stating that the latter are being encroached upon. These traditional identities, being an integral part of the population in the East of Ukraine, constitute an important part of the social order. Thus, this sector is the second point of departure in our research.

The military sector encompasses all components of ruling and a threat in this sector can question the most important obligation of government – the ability to protect its citizens. Military security mostly consists of the armed offensive and defensive abilities of the state. In our case, the military abilities of the Russian Federation are not in question, as within our context, the threat of military invasion of Russia from Ukraine is virtually non-existent. Moreover, the EU, as an international subsystem, does not have a common army and is only able to attack with the help of NATO allies. Moreover, as years have shown, Western nations mainly prefer to use soft economic power concerning Russia. We will examine the military sector only partially since the narrative of Russia concerning Crimea and Donbas suggests that if the people in these regions 'seek out reunification with Russia' they may be threatened with the presence of the Ukrainian army and special forces.

The economic sector partially concerns us within the scope of research since the counteractions to the involvement of Russian authorities in Crimea and Donbas from the West have included economic sanctions. Even though the main securitizing discourse of Russia has revolved around identity, the economic impact of sanctions from functional actors on the effectivity of securitizing discourse needs to be considered. In the economic sector, the existential threat is difficult to pinpoint due to the nature of the economy itself. In the market economy, firms and businesses are expected to appear and disappear, and threats to them would be only rarely securitized in the cases where economic issues impact the well-being of the whole nation. Since economic security is associated with resources, finances, and markets necessary to maintain an adequate level of the population and government, sanctions against Russia can be presented as an existential threat to the whole market economy and subsequently survival of the nation. However,

since we are analyzing identity discourse, economic threats would only be evaluated within the context of audience response to the securitizing narrative.

Lastly, the environmental sector does not particularly concern us since Russia is one of the largest oil and gas producers in the industry and has little concern for the environment even if we look out of the scope of securitizing discourse.

2.5 Theoretical conclusions

In the literature review contained in this chapter, we have presented the theoretical connection between security and identity, explored the notion of identity politics within nation-states, and presented an analytical securitization theory framework that will be used for our analysis. Securitization theory will help us analyze the complexity of security through the level and sectoral approach, which strictly defines actors, their scope of influence on each level, and sectors within which securitization may occur. We have also established the parameters for successful securitization, distinguishing between successful securitization and securitizing move, as well as the role of the audience in the process. The theoretical background will help us place actors inside the framework and look at securitization within each sector in a practical examination of narrative discourse.

3. Discourse Analysis

In the scope of this thesis, we are going to analyze if and how successful is the Russian Federation's leadership in securitizing identity within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. By examining the background of the conflict and providing a theoretical framework of securitization theory, we expect the securitizing discourse to be successful in the case of Crimea and less successful in the case of the Donbas region. This research will further elaborate on the use of language in the discourse and its role played in the effectivity of convincing the audience that identity is indeed existentially threatened.

This chapter is going to explain the methods used in measuring securitizing attempt and audience response. It will further elaborate on how theoretical methods would be applicable in our specific context, by presenting criteria against which we will measure the success of discourse, scope of analysis with specifications of its relevance and presentation of coding methodology. Analytical outcomes stemming from the application of methods will be explained in the analysis section, divided into an analysis of securitization and analysis of audience response. Conclusions will provide a summary of findings and implications stemming from them.

3.1 Criteria of successful securitization within the narrative discourse.

As we have mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the process of securitization is defined by two stages: a statement that an existential threat is present regarding the referent object and the completion of securitization, which would be successful if the securitizing agent has convinced the audience of statement validity. A method, through which Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde suggest an analysis of securitization is the study of discourse. This means that securitization is deemed successful when the argument with a specific linguistic and semiotic structure achieves a necessary level at which the audience allows violation of the present norms and rules. In the line of linguistic analysis, security is understood not as an objective absence of threats, but a discursive act, as action through utterance.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde base their understanding of speech on the theory of speech acts presented by J. Austin (Austin, 1975). In Austin's understanding speech acts can be performative, meaning that by issuing an utterance the actor is performing an action. For example, by saying "bet" the speech author is not only saying a word but performing the action of betting

(Austin, 1975, p 6). A specific performative act used in discourse analysis is called an ‘illocutive act’, meaning ‘il’ – inside. An illocutive act, containing a certain power within it, not only indicates the meaning of the expressed proposition, but also the communicative purpose of such a statement. In a sense, it establishes the meaning of the utterance together with performative powers. An example of the illocutive act could be a statement such as “he *argued* that.”. Simply stating that “he *said* that” would only imply the meaning of the utterance while indicating that “he *argued* that” indicates the communicative purpose of the author (Austin 1975, p.102). The importance of performative acts in the formulation of J. Austin is important for securitization in several ways. Firstly, the formulation of speech acts presents the idea that security can be seen through the prism of illocution, meaning that securitization can be achieved by the mere statement of security and by setting the criteria according to which securitization can be successful or unsuccessful.

In the theory of securitization, speech acts cannot be true or false. However, these acts need to follow a set of specific rules and regulations and are constrained by certain restrictions. Since the second stage of securitization discourse is the acceptance by an audience of the securitizing move, certain circumstances may attribute to it. Austin is referring to these as ‘successful conditions’ - conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused (Austin, 1975, p. 14-15). In the theory of securitization, these are referred to as ‘facilitating conditions’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p 32). This means that:

1. The speech act must be constructed in accordance with the “accepted conventional procedure” relating to the statement itself.
2. The specific persons and conditions must be suitable for carrying out a specific procedure, which is addressed using a statement.
3. The procedure must be performed by all participants correctly.
4. The procedure must be completed by all participants in full.
5. The person participating in the speech act must be sincere in his statement.
6. Each person participating in a speech act must “live” in accordance with the statement, take appropriate actions.

Moreover, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde present other conditions for the successful development of the speech act. They separate them into two categories: internal (linguistic-grammatical) and external (contextual, social) (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32)

Internal (linguistic-grammatical) conditions of successful speech act are in line with the first ‘successful condition’ of Austin, meaning that the speech act should follow the common rules of construction, pursue the language of security and construct an instant which includes an existential threat, point of no return.

The intention of securing power or the audience’s attention can be successfully realized through the dichotomy of ‘self-other’ in the discourse of the political elite. The task of the securitizing actor is to introduce oneself as a member of the audience that is being addressed, finding the characteristics that could unite him with the target population. At the same time, he needs to construct the ‘other’ – someone or something that does not fall in the established friendly category. Some indicative criteria that put something in a ‘self’ or ‘other’ representations are worldviews and shared values. The self-other dichotomy is useful for the establishment of relations between a politician and audience and helps influence the emotions of the addressee, subsequently inducing a desired point of view. The dichotomy can be realized through distancing the ‘other’ by using defamatory tactics of accusations, expressions of mistrust, mockery, ridicule, insults; creating a positive circle of ‘self’ by mentioning common interests, views. The demonstration of general linguistic turns used to construct the self-other dichotomy is presented in Table 3 (Cook, 1994, pp. 965-969).

External (contextual or social) conditions of successful speech act represent the position taken by securitizing actors, corresponding to the second “successful condition” of Austin. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde state that these conditions include:

1. The social capital of a securitizing actor, meaning that he needs to have an authority (in our case it is already present, as we are dealing with state authority). The social circumstance of the authority’s position is the relationship of authority to the audience; the likelihood that the audience is going to accept statements that are made in an attempt to securitize.

Table 3. Linguistic tools for creating ‘self-other’ dichotomy

	Linguistic tool	Example
	Statements with the inclusive pronoun	“ we”
	Statements with the meaning of compatibility	“ all together”, “ we are together”, “ together with”
	Statements expressing the social group relevance with vocative function, including ethnonyms	“ friends”, “ colleagues”
	Statements in the form of an imperative	“ let us think”, “ let us decide”
	Expressions with national precedent	names of classics, historical events, quotes from songs, cinema, literature
	Colloquial words and phrases	“ pull a rabbit out of the bag”
	Expressions in the form of a slogan cliché	“ We do this, so you don’ t have to”
	Linguistic units with the meaning of primacy, leadership	“ the best”, “ top”, “ first-rate”, “ most efficient”
	Linguistic units expressing political values	“ freedom”, “ progress”, “ national interest”
	Expressing distrust of the opponent	“ so-called”, “ a certain”
	Expressing an expressively evaluative negative element	“ discord”, “ split”, “ terrible”, “ weaken”
	Expressing offensive foreign ideologization or labels	“ Commies”, “ Banderas”, “ Fascists”
	Indefinite pronouns	“ some”, “ any”
	Expressing irony	“ duck the opportunity”
	Evaluative comparisons	“ useful-harmful”, “ honest-shameless”, “ right-wrong”, “ smart-narrow-minded”
‘Other’		

Note: Author’s compilation of linguistic tools as presented in *Discourse, Ideology and Literature* by Cook, J. (1994)

2. The features of a threat itself: if a securitizing actor is presenting something as a threat, that can in principle be threatening (such as the possibility of military intervention), it is more likely to spark the imagination of the audience, and, therefore, more likely to be successfully securitized.

In the introduction to the discourse analysis, we have seen that without the successful mobilization of the audience outside of the normal scope of politics, an issue cannot be a security threat. Language is used as a driving force for the escalation of threat discourse, being a powerful political instrument. When evaluating narrative discourse, we are going to use two sets of sources: one for analysis of securitizing discourse and another one for measurement of audience response. Through the use of categories, we will be able to devise different elements of threats in the securitizing discourse. Later, the securitizing discourse is going to be measured against the criteria presented in the narrative discourse theory chapter. A detailed description of chosen sources, methods, categories, coding, and reasoning behind them will be discussed later in the chapter.

3.2 Introduction to the utilized sources

Narrative discourse analysis, as the main tool of this research, is going to consider securitizing discourse led by the leadership of the Russian Federation and evaluate the reception of the above mentioned by the audience - population within Russia. The discourse can be seen as an interaction between two main actors within the system: a securitizing actor that is trying to convince the audience of an existential threat and audience that can accept or reject the discourse. Therefore, we will establish two sets of corpora used for discourse analysis with each set having different categories that measure the effectivity of securitization.

Since we are analyzing securitizing narrative coming from Russian authorities, the first corpus of discourse analysis would consist fully of documents in the Russian language. Even though used documents exist in the English version, there are several reasons for the use of the Russian one. Firstly, discourse analysis as a tool is based on the linguistic and semiotic properties of the used language within the text. As we have seen in the previous section, discourse analysis uses tools such as analysis of colloquial words/expressions or language-specific phrases. Russian and English language differ significantly: starting from the roots of language itself, different structures of sentences, differences in descriptive tactics of situations, etc. Moreover, some of the phrases and metaphors only exist in one language or another, therefore, cannot be translated or

may change their particular meaning if translated. Thus, if we do not want to miss specific details of the texts in the corpus, we would prefer to use Russian texts for analysis. Another reason for using texts in Russian is also connected to the properties of language. Since the transcripts/texts are collected from the official website of the Kremlin, we may not be certain of the correctness of the official translation. Russian Federation is considered to be very controlling of the information that is put out to the public and foreign media and is placed 149/180, being the lowest on the European Continent, on World Press Freedom Index 2019 (Reporters Without Borders, 2020). Therefore, we cannot be sure that the texts, even on the official website, have not been manipulated for some reason. All necessary excerpts from the texts, needed to support the claims in the analysis, will be translated into English to the best of the author's ability as a native Russian speaker.

We will also set the timeframe for the analysis, which would span from June 2013 – June 2015. The reasoning behind this timeframe is the possibility to include analysis of main securitizing narrative around the time of the annexation of Crimea and the start of the securitizing narrative concerning Donbas. This will allow us to establish the criteria, such as specific linguistic turns and tactics, used before annexation, and apply/compare them to the ones used in the context of Donbas. A longitudinal study of identity discourse would be more beneficial and is encouraged by the author for further exploration of the topic. However, it is not possible to conduct a more inclusive analysis within the timeframe and resources available to the author.

The first corpus of texts needed for analysis of securitizing discourse will be comprised of the documents collected from the official website of Kremlin, specifically a page containing transcripts of texts produced by Vladimir Putin, as an established securitizing actor (President of Russia, 2020). Since the securitizing discourse is aimed at the target audience, we will look at the texts directly targeting it: these transcripts will include speeches and public addresses aimed at the general population. Other documents will include interviews, articles, and statements on the major issues provided as transcriptions on the official website. Although some of these texts are not aimed at the general population per se, the audience has access to these texts, as most were aired on national television during the time of their presentation. The sorting mechanism for the chosen texts is based on the identification of keywords within the corpus, such as "Ukraine", "Crimea", "Donbas", "Kyiv", "security", "identity", "threat" established as points of departure in discourse analysis through a theoretical framework. Most of the analyzed texts will be provided in a separate

bibliography concerning corpus sources. Other texts that include only short mentions of the conflict, would be presented if they contain specific elements of securitizing tactics.

Sources utilized for analysis of audience response to securitizing narrative and overall effectivity of securitization will mainly consist of opinion polls on attitudes of the Russian Federation's population presented by 'Levada-Center' polling agency (Levada-Center, 2020). Even though several polling agencies exist within Russia, such as the 'Russian Public Opinion Research Centre' or 'Fund of Public Opinion', most are state-controlled. Levada-Center is considered to be the most reputable pollster within Russia, as reported by European media and its use in academic research papers. It is important to note that the government of Russia had several instances of a crackdown on the organization, with the shutdown of its departments, being named a 'foreign agent' with suspected Western bias through organization's funding, which was later discontinued, or banning of the poll publications and results in major state-funded newspapers (BBC, 2016). Nevertheless, Levada-Center is the most reputable source that we may use in our analysis, as the possible use of polls from Western media may limit the quantity of information needed for analysis or may be biased as well. The specific opinion polls used in the analysis will be aimed at several aspects of public opinion: attitudes of the population regarding Russia itself (i.e. regarding patriotism, pride, respect for the country, etc.), attitudes towards the conflict in Ukraine (i.e. Russian-Ukrainian relations, Russian participation in the crisis, regarding Crimean accession to Russia, etc.), attitudes toward the West (i.e. threats from the West, Russia and the World, Western Politicians), problems within Russia itself (i.e. what makes Russians anxious), the impact of sanctions and attitudes toward politics (i.e. electoral ratings, the role of personality in politics, trust and evaluation of the government). Selected categories for analysis are created deductively based on the theoretical framework of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, namely: sectors, levels of analysis, and actors.

The reasoning behind choosing opinion polls instead of discourse presented in media articles is the general unavailability of reliable media sources directly in Russia, that could objectively report on public opinion. As we have mentioned earlier, Russian Federation ranks very low on the World Press Freedom Index, with most of the media sources being controlled by the state. Therefore, we might expect a significant political bias within these sources, that would skew the results of the analysis and make it unreliable. Even though several news sources in Russia are still seen as independent, such as "Dozhd", "Meduza", "Novaya Gazeta" etc., we would

nevertheless prefer to stay away from their reporting. In 2020, the abovementioned newspapers have created a news syndicate comprised of 25 news sources, with the main aim to create media that “truthfully reports on the problems in the country”. However, since the organizers of the syndicate explicitly state that “a giant, budget funded machine is working against us”, we may encounter a political opposition bias in the reporting, especially in the editorials (Batalov, 2020). Such editorial bias is present in almost any major newspaper, regardless of the newspaper’s country of origin or affiliations. Therefore, the only media source that we will use in our analysis, would be ‘Euronews’, which is generally considered least biased, with the articles used to collect information on the actions of the Russian government concerning Ukraine. These articles would serve the sole purpose of a litmus test for the presence of extraordinary measures taken by Russia regarding Ukraine. Articles used for the analysis of extraordinary measures will be collected directly from the website’s archive page and provided in the corpus sources bibliography.


3.3 Coding Methodology

For our research purposes, we needed to test the concepts and patterns known from the background analysis and presented theory using new empirical data from the selected corpora. This approach is called deductive research, involving a systematic sifting, charting, and sorting research material to summarize and classify large dataset from text into categories within it. Since we are engaging in theory-testing research, we are trying to test if Russian official identity securitization discourse was indeed successful relating Crimea and less successful relating Donbas.

A specific research method used in this work is based on the ‘General Step-by-step Model of Qualitative Content Analysis’ by Philipp Mayring (Mayring, 2014, p.54). The general model presupposes the preliminary analysis of the background material, followed by establishing the direction of analysis, i.e. establishing key research questions and thesis. Later, the general sub-components of the material are established and the concrete procedural model with the definitions of content analytical units are presented. In the previous parts of the research paper, we have followed through these steps and arrived at the analysis through the means of creating a specific category system for each corpus. Here we are going to utilize the ‘Deductive Category Assignment’ for the coding as presented by Mayring, which aims at extracting a certain structure from the material (Mayring, 2014, p.95). By determining fundamental structuring dimensions derived from the statement of the problem, we further subdivide them into individual features and

values that are subsequently brought together to create a category system. A visualization of the method is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Steps of deductive category assignment



Note: Reproduction of deductive category assignment in *Qualitative Content Analysis Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and Software Solution* by Mayring, P. (2014)

3.3.1. Coding securitization attempt

For the qualitative analysis and deduction of categories, we uploaded texts with 531 916 words into the corpus manager Sketch Engine. This was done to establish the collocates of keywords from the theoretical chapter and background for the subsequent interpretation of

categories. Collocations in the corpus linguistics represent a sequence of words or terms whose frequency of occurrence and probability of occurrence together in the corpus is higher than expected. Since we were interested in the portrayal of the threat to identity within the context of Russo-Ukrainian conflict, we decided to find the collocates of the main preliminary keywords pursuing language of security and constructing a situation which includes an existential threat based on data discovered in the background analysis: “Ukraine”, “Crimea”, “Kyiv”, “security”, “identity”, “threat”, “fascist”, “nationalist”, “Russia”, “reunification”, “nation”, “peoples”, “Maidan”, “South-East”. We looked at the collocates since they provided data on quantitative repetitions of certain combinations of words. The interval for collocates to the source word was set at 5 words each on the right and left side. An example of collocates can be found in Appendix 1. Collocates allowed us to identify interconnections between keywords within the context and further narrow down the coding categories. According to the deductive category assignment we flagged the anchors representing categories in texts and set encoding rules for each category to provide the number of references indicating their intensity in the discourse with the help of qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA (Appendix 2). We also provided reasons for code within the context of documents.

Table 4. Interpreted coding categories for securitizing discourse.

<i>Coding category</i>	<i>Anchor sample</i>	<i>Encoding rules</i>	<i>Number of references</i>
Reunification	“Crimea returned to its native harbor, to its historical Motherland” “It is clear that now when the dream of Crimeans came true and the reunification took place.”	Must contain references to Russia. Must contain word Crimea	10
Nationalism/Fascism	“Of course, we will continue to resist attempts to falsify history, to heroize the Nazis and their accomplices, to tarnish the memory and good name of the hero-liberators”	Must contain reference to Ukraine, reference to WWII, convey a sense of 'other'.	24

Cultural unity	“This fully applies to Ukraine, the fraternal Ukrainian people”	Must contain a reference to culture and identity. Reference to cultural brotherhood preferred.	61
Regionalism	“They hoped that Ukraine would be our good neighbor, that Russian and Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine, especially in the Southeast and Crimea would live in a friendly, democratic, civilized state, that their legitimate interests would be ensured under international law”	Must contain territorial/cultural/economic elements. References to Ukraine, Crimea specifically.	12
The West	“They hardly make their way through that Russo phobic information campaign organized both in the West and in Ukraine, but they make their way”	Must 'other' Western nations, the Ukrainian government. Include elements of vilification.	101
Liberation	“In 2014, we will also celebrate the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Sevastopol and in 2015, the anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War”	Must refer to the historical ties of Russia with Crimea. It can contain other historical references from Ukraine.	43
Security threat	“Look, after all, many young people do not even know about the great feat of children who fought against the Nazis, and today the threat of fascism has risen to its full height again”	Must refer to threat to domestic security or security of people in South-East of Ukraine. It can include the threat from Ukraine or the West.	117
Cultural references	“Recently, Bortko’s wonderful film “Taras Bulba” has been banned in Ukraine. Just think, the	Must include references to collective history (literature, names, quotes).	14

	great Bulba with his phrase "there is nothing holier than bonds of brotherhood" is prohibited in a fraternal Slavic country. How can one come to this insanity?"	It can be connected to Russia or Crimea.	
Identity	"This is a huge danger of losing the national and cultural traditions, identity; for people and countries to dissolve in the global world"	Must specifically include a reference to 'identity'. It does not have to be in a specific context.	59

Note: Representation of coding categories based on *Deductive Category Assignment*, (Mayring, 2014)

In the preliminary analysis of the selected corpus, we have noticed that many key excerpts from the text contain a combination of indicators for established categories. Besides, passages contain linguistic elements of establishing ‘self-other’ dichotomy from Table 3, allowing us to judge the discourse against the first ‘successful condition’ of J. Austin and linguistic-grammatical conditions of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. This discovery will help us analyze the effectivity rate of specific use of language uniquely from one category or in combination with other types of language.

Below are brief descriptions of each category and its importance within the securitizing discourse.

Reunification: This is an indicator of an attempt to convince the audience in the legitimacy of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. This is a key category, as by narrating historical ties of Russia with Crimea and Sevastopol, V. Putin mentions reasoning behind the extraordinary measures taken regarding it. Reunification is narrated in connection with language indicating self-defense, unity, preservation of the nation, and fraternal relations.

Nationalism/Fascism: This category puts direct emphasis on the type of threat faced by the people in the East of Ukraine. Language in this category is often present in speeches recounting events of WWII and appealing to the collective memory of solidarity. Document excerpts in this category indicate that the abovementioned threat comes from the West and the new Ukrainian Government,

therefore the use of wartime language and memory attempts to appeal to solidarity and unity to gather mass support for actions in the South-East region.

Cultural Unity: This is an explicit category that defines the type of culture that needs to be protected from an existential threat. In this category, V. Putin often indicates that identity should be seen through the prism of the specific historical development of culture. By building an understanding of identity through the comparison of cultural development of Russia and Ukraine, V. Putin tries to appeal to the audience by indicating that the threat to similar values of people in the East of Ukraine is comparable to the threat of values of the audience itself, therefore making it more personal. This category is constructed through the mentions of cultural elements, such as common authors, sculptors, artists, national leaders, etc. and their role in the creation of common history.

Regionalism: This is an abstract category that indicates the view of Ukraine and South-East of Ukraine through the lens of regionalism. This category is important for the securitizing discourse, as regionalism presupposes close cooperation between territories or states in different aspects of economy, politics, or culture. By narrating ties that connect Ukraine and its regions with Russia, V. Putin establishes the connection between nations in the minds of the audience, to state that any threat to the ties is a threat to Russia as well. We need to mention that this category is not to be confused with indicating imperialism.

The West: This is a category that bulks up perceived hazards to the securitizing actor, V. Putin, and presents them as one coherent existential threat. This category is important, as it allows the threat to be universalized under the overarching term of the presented enemy to ensure that each member of the audience finds an aspect of 'other' that resonates with them. In this category, V. Putin does not present liberalization or westernization directly as a threat coming from the abovementioned entity, but rather mentions dichotomies in the world views and histories that create a divide between Russia's population and 'other'.

Liberation: This category is of special importance in the securitizing discourse, as it uses the history of Eastern Ukraine in connection to Russia and collective memory of WWII. Liberation in this context resonates with the audience, as most remember sacrifices made by Soviet soldiers in the War. By mentioning that threats to people in Eastern Ukraine are similar to those in the War,

V. Putin creates the case of the urgent need to implement extraordinary measures, so that the 'history' would not repeat itself.

Security Threat: This category indicates the proposition of an existing threat in general terms. The context of the excerpts often relates to the threat to national unity, a threat to national interests, stability, and peace. Here, V. Putin explicitly states what should be seen as a threat, constructing the image in the consciousness of the audience.

Cultural References: This is an explicit category that indicates what kind of culture is used to construct the securitizing discourse. By referring to specific elements of literature, films, songs, or quotes of famous people from the collective history, the securitizing actor is indicating what kind of values these texts represent to create a specific sense of identity that needs to be protected. Some of these references directly target the perceived shared values of people in the Russian Federation and Eastern Ukraine.

Identity: This is a general category that identifies the context of the threat to the referent object. By constructing a notion of unique identity in the minds of the audience, Putin has the opportunity to present it as being existentially threatened.

3.3.2 Coding audience response

As we have mentioned earlier, to analyze the effectivity of securitizing discourse we need to measure the response of the audience to the narrative. For this part of the analysis, we are once again going to implement the deductive category assignment method to the second corpus consisting of opinion poll results and news articles. Categories used to assess the acceptance or rejection of the discourse are going to be connected to the issues, threats, and suggestions presented by securitizing author and look at a) whether the audience accepted the narrative, and b) if extraordinary measures were implemented. The categories are going to be divided into two for each issue: one subcategory indicating acceptance of discourse and another for rejection. This is done to ensure that the analysis of the effectivity is balanced and does not present only one side of the issue. Moreover, we will measure the response concerning Crimea and Donbas separately based on the timeline of the events.

Table 5. Interpreted coding categories for audience response to securitizing discourse.

<i>Acceptance of securitizing discourse</i>	<i>Rejection of securitizing discourse</i>
Supporting the decision to annex Crimea	Condemnation of decision to annex Crimea
Accepting a narrative of cultural/historical unity of Russian Federation with Eastern Ukraine	Rejection of narrative of cultural/historical unity of Russian Federation with Eastern Ukraine
Condemnation of Maidan Protests	Support/No particular feelings towards Maidan Protests
Support for calls for independence of Eastern Ukraine	Disapproval of calls for independence of Eastern Ukraine
Support for possible military actions involving Russia in Eastern Ukraine	Condemnation of possible military actions involving Russia in Eastern Ukraine
Condemnation of authorities in Kyiv, acceptance of vilification discourse	Rejection of vilification discourse concerning authorities in Kiev
Condemnation of 'The West', acceptance of vilification discourse	Rejection of vilification discourse concerning the 'West'
Increase in levels of the Russian government support	A slump in levels of support of the Russian government
Increase in national pride/patriotism	A decrease in national pride/patriotism

Below are the brief descriptions of categories used to measure audience response:

Supporting the decision to annex Crimea/ Condemnation of decision to annex Crimea

This is a specific category measuring the direct response to the securitizing discourse for the support of proposed, and later implemented an extraordinary measure of unilateral annexation of Crimea. Since the securitizing actor is shaping the discourse directly around the identities of people in this region, this category will give a clear response of the audience to the discourse concerning the Crimean Peninsula. This category can be measured through opinions on the legitimacy of Referendum, opinions of involvement of Russian authorities in it, the suspected military threat from Russia, or acceptance that the annexation was necessary, as it was ‘asked by the people of Crimea’

*Accepting/Rejecting a narrative of cultural/historical unity of Russian Federation with Eastern
Ukraine*

Since one of the main tactics of constructing securitizing discourse around identity was the narration of cultural, identity, and value similarities as well as the common historical development of Russia and Eastern Ukraine, we can measure the reasoning of the audience behind the support of the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Donbas. Opinion polls that can provide the data include knowledge and evaluation of audience of historical terms (such as Novorossiya), attitude towards Ukrainians/ Eastern Ukrainians as people, evaluation of national values and stereotypes, evaluation of disinformation and propaganda movies subsidized by Russian authorities.

Condemnation of Maidan Protests/ Support/No particular feelings towards Maidan Protests

This is a specific category evaluating the role of Maidan protests in the escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Since the Maidan protesters are often vilified in the securitization discourse and being compared to the Nazis, we can measure the degree to which the audience agrees with those statements. Opinion polls used for analysis in this category include the opinions on the influence of protesters on the government in Kyiv, opinion on whether they present a threat to the people in Eastern Ukraine, statements describing them, opinion on ideological affiliations of these people.

Support for calls for independence of Eastern Ukraine/ Disapproval of calls for independence of Eastern Ukraine

This is a broad category that measures the attitudes of the audience towards the situation in Eastern Ukraine. Although the securitizing actor does not directly imply that the extraordinary measures need to be implemented in the region, he nevertheless uses similar securitizing tactics concerning it. This category can evaluate the attitude of an audience on the support of the independence of Donbas region, perceived goals of separatists, the role of the Russian government in the region's politics, opinions on which groups are involved in the conflict, as well as on laws providing for greater autonomy in the region.

Support for possible military actions involving Russia in Eastern Ukraine/ Condemnation of possible military actions involving Russia in Eastern Ukraine

This is a specific category that measures the response of the audience to the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Since the securitizing discourse in this instance implies that Russian Federation is not directly involved in the armed conflict, but it is nevertheless possible, we can measure if the audience supports an open armed conflict involving state troops. We can also measure the support for the separatists, support of Russian volunteers fighting among separatists, attitudes towards the degree of involvement of Ukrainian and the Russian government in the conflict, as well as evaluation of responsible parties in interruptions of a ceasefire.

Condemnation of authorities in Kyiv, acceptance of vilification discourse/ Rejection of vilification discourse concerning authorities in Kiev

This is an implicit category that measures the response to stated vilification of authorities in Kyiv, be that interim government or subsequently elected government. Since the narrative discourse directly states that ideological threats to identity come from the newly elected government in Ukraine, we can measure if the audience supports the claim by analyzing the ways audience chooses to describe these authorities, their role, and extent of involvement in the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, comparison of attitudes towards Ukrainians as a nation and government itself.

*Condemnation of 'The West', acceptance of vilification discourse/ Rejection of vilification
discourse*

This is a broader category that measures the audience's response to the 'other' constructed in the securitizing discourse. Since the securitizing actor portrays the threat coming directly from the West and infringing upon values of people in Eastern Ukraine, we can measure the attitude towards this bulked up actor by analyzing perceived disconnect of values between the West and Russia, the attitude towards the perception of the historical role of West in the shaping of Russian and Ukrainian values, the perceived role of the West in the Maidan Revolution, influence on the Ukrainian Government, as well as attitudes towards West as being hostile agent threatening Russia indirectly through Ukraine.

*Increase in levels of Russian government support/ Slump in levels of support of the Russian
government*

This is a separate category that measures the success of the securitizing discourse in connection to the external contextual condition of a successful speech act, which allows the discourse to be more successful through an increase of trust in securitizing authority. We can measure this category by looking at the opinion polls on the audience's understanding of government's role in the provision of security, opinion on the role of the leader, polls on political support for Vladimir Putin and the members of the Duma, as well as the opinion on the handling of the conflict in Ukraine by the abovementioned authorities.

Increase in national pride/patriotism/ Decrease in national pride/patriotism

This is a broad category that facilitates the success of securitizing act through the use of national affiliation. Since the concept of diving and conquering is present in the securitizing discourse, we can measure how the audience feels about its own country and nationality, and how it relates itself to Ukrainians, people from Eastern Ukraine or the West. This category is important since nationality is closely intertwined with the concept of identity and helps create or break bonds between people. We may look at opinion polls regarding the understanding of concepts, such as patriotism, nationalism, national unity, and the nation as a whole. We may also look at how

Russians view their own country and problems within it to pin any underlying issues that may change the effectivity of securitization.

The next section will present findings from the analysis of the corpora with the help of the presented methodology. In the end, we will present the conclusions by returning to our research question and proving or disproving the hypothesis that securitizing discourse was successful in the case of Crimea and less successful in the case of Donbas.

3.4 Analysis of securitization attempt

To start the analysis of the securitization discourse we need to remember that identity is intersubjective and can be created and promoted by the securitizing actor – in the case of this analysis Vladimir Putin. Putin in his public discourse attempts to create the identity that needs to be protected from the existential threat and is based on the historical, cultural, language, religious unity of Eastern Ukraine and its peoples with the Russian Federation.

3.4.1 Construction of Identity

Putin, with the use of tsarist era terminology, often mentions that Crimea and Sevastopol have been historically a part of the Russian land, through the references to the rule of Catherine the Great. In this discourse Putin revives the term Novorossiia, stating the cities of Lugansk, Donetsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv, being a part of the abovementioned term, were given to Ukraine by USSR in the 1920s. Moreover, the city of Sevastopol has also been transferred in the 1950s to Ukraine. The revival of these historical references is important for the discourse since it allows Putin to state that the Russian people and people with the Russian-Slavic identity have been left behind in these territories after the collapse of the USSR (Putin, 2014f, 2014l). Putin in his speeches often uses colloquial phrases to emphasize the injustices inflicted on the Eastern Ukrainian population by stating for example that “ I heard how Crimean people recently say that back then, in 1991, they were transferred between hands like a sack of potatoes”. (Putin, 2014l). This language is important for invoking the feeling of compassion in the audience, as the term ‘sack of potatoes’ presumes that something is not important. Putin explicitly states that by the separation of the land at the end of the USSR, people living in the regions were unjustly separated from their families as well, and it needs to be considered a big issue. Moreover, he states that

Russia has an obligation to protect the identity of the people in the Crimean peninsula, as, in the worlds of Catherine the Great, Crimean Tatars are to be considered subjects of Russia and are entitled to preservation of their identity, cultural memory, and religion.

Vladimir Putin mentions that apart from the common history, people of the Crimean Peninsula are considered culturally similar to Russians. In the address to the nation, Putin states that “in the hearts and minds of people Crimea has always been and will remain a historical part of Russia” (Putin, 2014l). This claim is amplified in the discourse that attempts to blur the lines between identities of the specific nations and put them under the umbrella of one united Pan-Slavic identity. In one speech Putin refers to the documents dated 1924, that shows the graph stating nationality “Великоросс” (literal translation “Big Russian”) and reminds that nowadays the same graph remains very similar with “Малоросс” (“Small Russian”) written in it. Using similar examples, Putin notes that people in the region consider themselves a part of ‘big Russian world’, their common home and ‘small homeland’ (Putin, 2014i, 2015k). Therefore, discourse is spun in the way that plays on the feelings of patriotism in the audience and later allows to state that the reunification of Crimea with Russia brought historical unity and justice. Lastly, Putin glorifies the people of Crimea and Sevastopol, stating that since the collapse of the USSR they have preserved themselves as a ‘spiritually healthy Russian organism’, maybe even better than some parts of Russia (Putin, 2014d). This kind of discourse invokes the feeling of pride and thankfulness in the patriotic portions of the audience, further allowing to gain support for the upcoming extraordinary measure. Language and cultural similarity of Eastern Ukrainians with Russians precisely in the discourse of Putin need to be protected at all costs and are used as a pretext for the extraordinary measure as we will discover further in the analysis.

Discourse on religion also plays an important role in the establishment of identity. Putin explicitly mentions that in the heart of the centralized Russian government, and the European territories, including Ukraine and Belarus, spiritual and moral values are a crucial factor in the unification of the peoples, and the Russian Orthodox Church at home and abroad is the defining actor to provide it. In the interview to the film “The Second Baptism of Rus”, Putin mentions that the representatives of the Russian Church themselves realize that the time has come for the reunification of the united Russian nation. The exact term used in the context is “Российский”, which implies that the nation lies under the “Russian Federation” and not simply “Russian nation” (Putin, 2013d). Moreover, the discourse blurs the line between nationality and religion once again,

as some excerpts from speeches mention that the term ‘nationality’ was interchangeable with ‘faith’ in the Russian Empire, therefore suggesting that those, who consider themselves affiliated with Russian Church inherit the presented identity as a well. When mentioning religion, Putin often states that since Russia and Ukraine are connected by the same historic moral-ethical roots they ultimately have the same fate (Putin, 2013d). This sort of language presents the opportunity to establish continuity in the common history and justify the extraordinary measure under the pretext of so-called ‘fate’, which is by definition unavoidable.

Lastly, the importance of Eastern Ukrainians in the establishment of the identity is given through the revival of the historical military role they have played in the Russo-Ukrainian Civil War and WWII. Putin regularly mentions the horrors of the Civil War of 1919, using colorful phrases to describe the atrocities of the war between the White Army and the Red Army, such as ‘fratricidal war’ that was conducted by the people ‘blinded by mutual hatred’ (Putin, 2014f). This sort of language gives the audience a sober reminder of the events, instilling fear of the situation repeating itself. Later on, Putin outlines that cities of Sevastopol and Crimea play an important role in the reconciliation of the peoples that have been forced to leave their Motherland. In the political speeches, Putin mentions that these territories can help “restore the connection of times, eras, unity of historical path of Russia, our national consciousness, hold a kind of cultural, historical therapy’ (Putin, 2014f). Putin, himself, holds a historical therapy for the audience by reminding it that Sevastopol has been awarded a title of ‘Hero-City’, and this emphasizes the remembrance of the bravery and sacrifices of the Russian soldiers for the betterment of the world. An important role in the construction of historical unity of identity is played by the use of symbolism, which not only states that the identity has been partially constructed by the people of Crimea, but reminds the audience of how it was done through the references to historical sites, names of soldiers and heroes that represent this identity. Putin notes that “Crimea contains graves of Russian soldiers; Crimea – is Sevastopol, Legend-city, Fortress-city, and Motherland of Russian Black Sea Navy Fleet; Crimea – is Balaklava, Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan, and Sapun Mountain” (Putin, 2014i). All these references serve the purpose of reminding the audience of the places that represent Russian military glory and the human losses to invoke deep patriotic feelings. Moreover, Putin notes that the nation should remember all military personnel who “bleeding out in bunkers were painting us their last message with their blood, the meaning of which is very simple: uphold Sevastopol” (Putin, 2014d). The use of colorful language sends a powerful message to the

audience, that the protection of the peoples in the region and the history that is buried there is a sacred duty of the Russian nation that should be carried in the hearts. Instilling this message allows Putin to establish solid grounds on which the martyrdom of Crimean annexation will be based.

3.4.2 Duty to protect: How did discourse justify extraordinary measures?

The justification of the extraordinary measures taken in Crimea and Donbas has been based on several factors, that together allowed for a concise and solid case for the duty to protect the people in Eastern Ukraine. These include:

1. Statements of the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government.
2. Alleged Western interference in regional politics.
3. Language and cultural discrimination concerning minority population with a subsequent violation of international norms
4. The threat of nationalism and violence in the region
5. The incompetence of the International Organizations in resolving issues of security
6. The external threat to the preservation of the Pan-Slavic identity in the region.

3.4.2.1 Illegitimacy of Ukrainian Government

Since the securitization discourse is based around the pan-Slavic identity of the population in Eastern Ukraine, Vladimir Putin explains that 2 million 200 thousand residents of the Crimean Peninsula predominantly consider Russian their native language and orient themselves toward Russia. This in combination with the abovementioned factors that connect Russia and Ukraine allows Putin to establish the reasons why the Russian Federation must protect this population.

According to the analysis of the texts through the coding methodology, we have found that the most prominent coding categories involved discourse around the threat of security and the West. Moreover, Category ‘The West’ separated security threats coming directly from the Western Nations and the involvement of foreign agents in its domestic politics of Ukraine. Putin often states that the changes to the constitution following the Maidan Revolution were used precisely as a pretext for the political struggle for power. Putin asserts the discourse stating that the ‘military overturn of the government’ has been mostly provoked by the foreign forces. The main actors in this provocation included the NGOs or ‘foreign agents’ (Putin, 2014e). Moreover, he notes that

the depth of the interference was incredible, penetrating even municipal governments and the finances involved in the functioning of these NGO's provided by foreign agencies were the main reason for the success of the opposition. For example, Putin directly provides the responsible parties for the conflict in the speeches such as "our European friends and friends from the USA supported the unconstitutional military capture of power", "our partners in the USA don't even hide that they were supporting those who were marching against President Yanukovich. Some openly said that they have spent several billion dollars on it" (Putin, 2014j, 2015l). Putin also mentions that the "anti-governmental propaganda machine" was working through the system of NGO's and were directly involved in the protests. This language narrative is important for convincing the audience of the threat, as the discourse against Western interference is generally prominent in the political discourse of the Russian Federation, stating that Western Powers are constantly on a mission to harm Russian Federation and exploit its sphere of influence. The discourse concerning the expansion of Western influence is seen through the portrayal of NATO and EU expansion that does not respect the boundaries of the sovereignty but blames the Russian Federation in doing the same, even though it is only done to protect its national and identity integrity. Putin states that the EU tries to "integrate the whole post-Soviet territories from Lisbon to Vladivostok, including the Western territories, such as, for example, Ukraine and Moldova", while the USA has set a goal to "capture European market at all costs... to burn their crazy debt", since the EU owes it for the support with the Marshall plan (Putin 2015n, 2014f). Moreover, it is explicitly mentioned that the new government of Ukraine is fully under external control, with some ministers being of foreign origin, and the government itself under control of radicals that would not allow any talks without their presence. Lastly, when president Yanukovich fled Ukraine, Putin proclaimed that the presidential race for the new government cannot be considered legitimate since the current president is still in power until officially sacked. The combination of creating an image of the illegitimate government controlled by enemy forces and the proclamation of the need to protect the East of Ukraine that seemingly have no say in the matter adds up to the compelling argument that Russian Federation needs to help people make their own decisions with Russia being an intermediary that ensures peaceful vote since Ukraine has proved to be incompetent in protecting its institutions from foreign interference.

3.4.2.2 Alleged Western interference in regional politics.

Apart from the Western interference in Ukrainian politics, Putin presents the expansion of NATO as the main threat to the cultural integrity of the population in the East of Ukraine. Putin starts the discourse with the suggestion that the main problem lies with the deception of NATO and its allies which have promised that they would not engage in expansionist policies Eastwards. Putin states that since the collapse of the bipolar world system, Russia's Western partners along with the USA have ended up "in a state of some euphoria" and decided that "they are the winners, they are an empire and the rest are vassals", and instead of cultivation of neighborly relations decided to explore new geopolitical opportunities (Putin, 2015o). The main arguments in this discourse are the presence of the tactical nuclear weapons on the borders with Russia and the development of military infrastructure around the globe, forcing the development of European and segments of strategical missile defense systems in Asia-Pacific bloc. The issue for Russia is that the movement of military personnel is considered threatening – Putin notes that Russian Federation cannot remain indifferent to the closing in on its borders, since "they (NATO) constantly involves itself in the defining fates of other nations, thousands of kilometers from its borders", as given in the examples of Romania, Poland (Putin, 2014j). Moreover, Putin states that the USA has one-sidedly left the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty creating security threats to the Russian population, when the Russian Federation does not even have military bases around the world and even stopped patrolling the border territory until recently, as a response to threats. The discourse on the security of territorial integrity is important in the context of securitization since it presents something that is physically threatening to the audience, making them more likely to accept the securitization discourse. Moreover, most of the Russian population remembers the threat of the nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War, therefore a similar threat to the fraternal peoples of Ukraine invokes the sense of compassion and the desire to protect them from a similar fate. Putin directly states that the calls for Ukraine joining NATO have been heard in Kyiv, and notes that the threat to the identity and security of the Russian-speaking population in the East of Ukraine are very real by saying that even the program of EU "Eastern Partnership" involved attempts to pose an "artificial choice between Russia and Europe"(Putin, 2015m). The most important aspect of the discourse revolves around the so-called artificial "color revolutions" under the guise of "democracy" staged by the West on the examples of Arab Springs, Kosovo, or Iran, where the abovementioned actors tried to forcefully impose their will. One such example is heard on the

conference of UNSC where Putin states that “US Secretary of State demonstrated the evidence to UNSC that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq while waving a test tube with washing powder. In the end, the US military entered Iraq, killed Saddam Hussein, and only then realized that no mass destruction weapons were ever there or are now’ (Putin, 2014j). This sort of example shows that the derogatory language used to describe the West which is used to demonize it and shows that the West attempts to cynically exploit peoples who are tired of tyranny and lack of opportunities, at the same time imposing standards that do not in any way correspond to the lifestyle, traditions or culture of these nations. Therefore, if the NATO and Western nations attempt to exert power over people of Eastern Ukraine, Russia cannot allow them to exploit the Russian-speaking population in the same fashion. Putin explicitly states that he should not allow the “NATO fleet to appear in the city of Russian military glory (Sevastopol)”, as it would be a threat to the entire South of Russia and Ukraine (Putin, 2014l).

3.4.2.3 Language and cultural discrimination concerning minority population with a subsequent violation of international norms

The main threat to the identity of people in Eastern Ukraine according to the discourse of Putin has been done through the illustration of infringement on the right of the Russian-speaking population. This infringement is illustrated on the consideration to overturn the Ukrainian Law “On the Basics of State Language Policy”, which would have allowed populations in the regions to decide on the language it would use if the 10% of the population would vote for it. Putin directly states that “the law has been put aside, but everybody clearly understands, that this is done by the Bandera minions – Hitler minions” and that “the main actors to initiate the overturn in Ukraine are nationalists, ultranationalists and Russophobes” (Putin, 2014l). Putin directly states that the people in the region have themselves considered that the outbursts of nationalism, personal threats, and the desire to take away the rights of national minorities, including Russian to be a grave danger, therefore the people themselves needed to “protect their family and children” (Putin, 2014q). Putin, in the context, often uses references to the family, as this institution is considered sacred in the hearts of Russians and the threat to it cannot be overseen in any circumstance. Moreover, Putin often uses polemics and vivid language to describe the atrocities that could have happened to the population if they would not come to Russia for help by stating that there have been attempts to “deprive Russians of historical memory, or even language, make them an object of forced assimilation”, or even worse “they turn them into outcasts on their land, trample their dignity with

impunity, scoff at them, and essentially deprive them of the right to life. And this is only because they speak a different language or profess other religious beliefs” (Putin, 2014l, 2014e). Once again, these linguistics techniques attempt to demonize the government of Ukraine through the revival of the threats of nationalism (with which the government is affiliated) and the establishment of common identity that unifies Russians and Eastern Ukrainians. Lastly, Putin states that these changes to laws were once again unconstitutional and did not attempt to involve people in the regions to whom these laws were directly relevant, and therefore Russia had no choice but to interfere, referring to the situation as a compression spring, allegorically saying that “if you press the spring all the way down, one day it will forcefully spring back” (Putin, 2014l).

3.4.2.4. The threat of nationalism and violence in the region

As we have noted in the thesis, the assumption for the most successful element of the securitizing discourse has been the revival of the WWII language and the threat of nationalism. Putin often reminds the audience that during the WWII Russian and Ukrainian people unitedly destroyed the ideology of human hatred, that has presented a threat to the existence of civilization and notes that nobody, in any country, should forget the horrific outcomes that can be brought by confidence in one’s uniqueness and attempts to achieve shady geopolitical goals by any means, including violations of elementary human rights and international norms. These sort of threats come directly from the West, according to Putin, who states that nowadays we see attempts to falsify the history of WWII and glorify and rehabilitate criminals of Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which directly insult the memory of the fallen, including those soldiers who are laid in the East of Ukraine. Therefore, Putin suggests that people sponsoring the unconstitutional overturn of power in Ukraine have followed the ideology of nationalism and radicalism, similar to what is allegedly happening in Latvia and other Baltic states. This discourse actively uses the imagery of atrocities that are happening in the Donbas area, with Putin stating that the Ukrainian government has “organized terror, killings and riots” with the use of military force and supplementing nationalists with weapons (Putin, 2014l). In one speech Putin suggests that “The Ukrainian security forces resumed shelling of Donetsk, Lugansk, launched multiple rocket systems, fly combat aircraft, “Sushkas” fly (a colloquial reference to Sukhoi Su-25 Grach military airplanes). Completely insane, or what?” (Putin, 2015p). The vivid imagery of the military offense presented to the Russian audience invokes fear for residents of the region and helps justify the counter-attacks by

the “pro-Russian groups” in the discourse, suggesting that they do not have a choice but to fight back to survive. For the audience, this means that the West is portrayed as an evil force compared to nationalists-fascists, which invoke a feeling of hatred and anger towards the Ukrainian offensive and the “actively supported from outside the "Party of War" in Kyiv that continues to attempt to push the Ukrainian people into the abyss of national disaster” (Putin, 2015m). What is more important, is that Putin notes a threat of radicalization of the population itself, since they, as victims of the conflict cannot feel otherwise after seeing the horrors of the conflict. In this case, Putin in his discourse transforms the perceived threat of liberalization and democratization of the population into the threat of radicalization and extremism, which is more favorable to push the discourse forward, saying that European colleagues who prefer to ignore this issue cannot be trusted in its resolution. For Putin, the need to protect the population in the east of Ukraine from the perceived repressions and violence from the Russophobes and nationalists is of grave importance, as the fraternal Russian-speaking population in the region cannot be left harmed. This discourse can be seen in the example of the severity of the situation presented by Putin, which states that the population has to “keep a hand not only on the pulse but on the throat of those who allow themselves to make Russia and Russians their enemy number one” (Putin, 2014f).

3.4.2.5 The incompetence of the International Organizations in resolving issues of security

In connection to the abovementioned threats to the population in the East of Ukraine, Putin often mentions another reason behind the need to protect them on the national level – the incompetence of the international organizations, namely: the UN, ECJ, the bureaucracy of the EU, and unfairness of international sanctions aimed at Russia. To start the securitizing discourse Putin notes that the Russophobia has become a business card of the Western politicians and the hatred towards Russia and Russians has reached its peak. Mentioning hostilities on the international arena allows Putin to suggest that since the collapse of the bipolar system, Western partners of Russia prefer to be guided not by the norms of international law, but by norms of the strongest, thinking that they are the only ones that can choose the fates of the nations and guide themselves by the rule of “those who are not with us are against us”. Putin suggests that the only things that rule the international arena nowadays are “double standards, ignorance, and fanaticism”, clearly led by the US, which in this case actively supported the overturn of the government in Kyiv (Putin, 2014f). Putin also implies that the legitimacy of the UN and UNSC are clearly trying to be shaken, as the

Western Partners are trying to bash out the resolutions from the international organization that works solely in their favor to justify violence. One such example is seen when Putin says that Russia is blamed for the conflict in Pridnestrovian, but cannot get out the resolution on Kosovo matter, as it is considered a “special case” due to amount of bloodshed. In this instance, Putin tries to illustrate the inconsistency of the judgment by stating “You cannot so rudely tune everything to your interests, call the same thing white today and black tomorrow. It turns out, it is necessary to bring any conflict to human losses, or what?” (Putin, 2014l). Moreover, Putin states that the European Court of Justice is now being used as a political tool by the Western forces, does not symbolize justice, but has turned into a primitive tool for political pressure on Russian Federation. Lastly, Putin suggests national justice systems of European nations ended up subject to the bureaucracy of Brussels, which allows imposing shady sanctions without consultation of all EU members by saying “ask them (colleagues from EU) about bureaucracy in Brussels – they will tell you how it’s done. Our bureaucrats in comparison to Brussel’s rest in peace” (Putin, 2014c). This sort of discourse serves the purpose of creating mistrust and discontent of the international justice system in the Russian audience, to justify the Russian involvement in the Ukrainian internal affairs. Since the identities of the people in the East of Ukraine are considered to be threatened, and Ukraine is not willing to protect it, Russia takes the duty to protect on itself because it cannot trust the international courts to make sound decisions. Putin himself states that “our colleagues took a different position: from pies on the Maidan, turned to promises of both political and economic nature. By the way, money must be paid to the Ukrainian people, but there is absolutely nothing, no one pays anything. They practically don’t give money; everything is done only through international financial organizations. Therefore, I believe our position was initially absolutely verified and objective” (Putin, 2014c).

3.4.2.6. Donbas region securitization discourse

In the context of Donbas, on the other hand, Putin seems to present a slightly different discourse to the audience. Vladimir Putin does not explicitly state what kind of extraordinary measure needs to be implemented but rather expresses his support for the militants and separatists in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The discourse, in this case, is based on the threat of the militarization and economic and political blockade of the territory by the Ukrainian government, the threat of nationalism, and the incompetence of the Ukrainian authorities to comply with the

Minsk Agreement and ceasefire resolutions. Putin starts off the discourse by asserting that the Ukrainian government is rapidly militarizing, though the statement that the military budget of UA has increased threefold and takes up 5 percent of countries GNI in one year, while its economy remains in a pitiful condition (Putin, 2015m). This sort of statement is important for the discourse, as the Donetsk and Lugansk region are considered to be the main industrial providers for the Ukrainian economy, however, it is not being invested in and is physically and economically degrading. On the press-conference to the media, Putin suggests that most of the regions in the East of Ukraine have voted for the opposition to the newly elected government expressing their concern about the local situation, with about 43% voting against newly elected Poroshenko government (Putin, 2014c). According to Putin, people from the regions have attempted to present the local candidates for the government, but instead of being listened to, they were met with heavy artillery and offensive from the side of Kyiv. By mentioning the situation around the economics and inability of the predominantly Russian-speaking population in Donbas to represent themselves politically and discuss the problems, Putin attempts to invoke compassion in the audience, which may relate to the issues faced by the people in Donbas and justify them in trying to protect themselves. Moreover, the same discourse allows Putin to vilify the Ukrainian government by suggesting that instead of listening to people's concerns it attempts to shut down the opposition with force. The same discourse can be seen concerning the ceasefires and the resolutions of the Minsk and Minsk-2 agreements. In this regard, Putin states that Ukrainian government fails to comply with the articles of the agreement, namely no changes in the constitution have been implemented that include particularities of the self-government of the territories, ignoring the agreements on allowing Donbas region to represent themselves politically and the amnesties promised to the militias, that would allow them to not be prosecuted for crimes (Putin, 2015l). This, in the language of Putin, shows that the Government of Ukraine is incapable of keeping its promises under signed documents, let alone listen to people. To further invoke hatred towards Ukrainian government in the audience, Putin uses vivid imagery by stating that "tanks were sent to the region, civilians were shot at from the airplanes, heavy artillery bombing is occurring on the civilian infrastructure", at the same time denying any presence of Russian Army in the region (Putin, 2014p). Moreover, the discourse in many instances' states that the offensive of the Kyiv forces cannot be seen as anything but "punitive operation" that is further supported by the economic blockade of the region to completely destabilize it (Putin, 2014j). The term "punitive"

in itself suggests that people are being punished solely for the desire to represent themselves and be heard, for speaking a different language and having particular cultural values that may not coincide with those in Kyiv. What is even more interesting about this discourse is that it invokes a very strong sense of compassion in the audience concerning people living in the region, by stating that they have no other choice but to stay and defend themselves. Putin uses very vivid, horrific imagery to describe the alleged opinion of the locals in Donbas “We cannot leave these villages (there are three or four villages that are controversial), we have families living there, we have children, wives, sisters there. We don’t want to be killed and raped there.” and that “people in Donbas... are big patriots of their small Motherland. Many do not want to leave even under missile bombings, because they love their land” (Putin, 2015b). The language in these excerpts invokes a strong patriotic feeling in the audience of Putin, namely because they can be paralleled with the atrocities conducted by the Nazis in WWII to the people in Russia and invoke the feelings of patriotism in Russian population in connection to historical past. Therefore, when a similar situation is presented as a threat to the fraternal, as suggested by Putin, the population in Donbas, people in the audience are more likely to support the official discourse. At the same time, Vladimir Putin repeatedly denies the presence of the Russian military in the region by saying “there are no Russian divisions, no special forces, no instructors on the East of Ukraine. These are all local people”, “They are lying (Western media). No armed forces, no instructors were or are present in the East of Ukraine”, “I am telling loud and clear: there are no Russian forces in Ukraine” (Putin, 2015b, 2014j, 2015p). Putin even mentions that these statements are verified by several officers in the Ukrainian government and people who are fighting in the region do not even wear masks. To gain the support of the audience, Putin also mentions, that all people that are fighting in the war are fighting for their rights and interest or “fulfill their duty by the call of heart” and are not paid for anything (Putin, 2014c). At the same time, Putin presents a dichotomy that it is unfair to call the militants in the region “pro-Russian separatists”, but those who were fighting with Russia in the Caucasus were allegedly financed by Al-Qaeda, were considered fighters for democracy. In this case, Russia vilifies the West and their attitude towards the conflict once again, at the same time positioning itself as a martyr, that simply tries to help the people in the region by fulfilling Minsk agreement duties and sending in humanitarian convoys. At the same time, Putin explicitly states that no extraordinary measure needs to be implemented at the time, as the Minsk-2 agreement outline a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

3.4.2.7 The external threat to the preservation of the Pan-Slavic identity in the region.

Lastly, Putin states that the question involving identities of the people in Eastern Ukraine is indirectly affected by the desire of the Russian civilization to preserve itself, to protect its values and integrity. Putin repeatedly states that he believes that Ukraine in itself does not interest anyone, but is used as an instrument for unbalancing international relations, as a prisoner of some international actor's will, such as reanimation of NATO, not as a military bloc per se, but as a foreign policy tool to unite satellite states and scare someone with an external threat (Putin, 2014n). This message is especially important to the audience, as it revives the discourse of the Cold War and the great power struggles of the political blocs which are awfully familiar to the Russian population. The situation in Ukraine then, according to Putin, is the payment for the natural desire of Russia to self-preserve as a civilization, as a state. Putin states that apart from repeatedly trying to bankrupt Russia with sanctions and previously stealing all the financial resources of the nation through the foreign finance channels, Western nations are now trying to create a domestic turmoil to completely destabilize Russia. Putin demonstrates this concept on several examples that are familiar to the audience such as the political image of Boris Yeltsin. Putin states that while Yeltsin was compliant with Western demands his rule was completely supported, but as soon as he proclaimed his support for Yugoslavia, everybody suddenly realized that he is an alcoholic, a shameful man, which was completely known before, and after he became concerned for the Balkans became the enemy number one in the eyes of the West (Putin, 2014i). To demonstrate this point further, Putin uses a colloquial example that hits close to the hearts of Russian people as it symbolizes Russia as a bear that is being attacked. Analogically, Putin says that the "bear wants to stay in peace and not drive piglets and gilts in the taiga (meaning West and USA), but eat berries and honey. But will he be left alone? No, because someone always tries to chain it, and as soon it happens they will tear out its teeth and claws. And when this is not enough, they will take the taiga too, just like the USA took Texas from Mexico. And when that is not enough, they will make a scarecrow out of him" (Putin, 2014c). This vivid analogy of Russia with its national symbol -the bear clearly intends to invoke the feeling of being personally attacked and threatened in the audience, as many identify themselves with the symbolism of a bear. In the case of Ukraine, the Bear represents a common identity shared by the Eastern Ukrainians and Taiga is Ukraine itself. In the same discourse, Putin also manages to create a sense of unity and common identity by asserting the power and might of the Russian nation in his speeches. Putin notes that

the Russian state will always protect the national interest of its people no matter what, and that “Russia is not a country that can be dictated. Not a country that can be told what to do. Russia – is one of the most powerful centers of a multipolar world, and today it is a given” (Putin, 2014f). Moreover, stating that Russia has one thing that no one else does – the truth - gives it might and ability to recognize what is unjust and invokes the feeling of patriotism in the audience, giving additional legitimacy to the government as a securitizing actor in the eyes of people. At the same time, Putin asserts the power and legitimacy of his personality, by stating that he has maintained his country secure and he mostly uses his intuition and knowledge of people to guide his judgment. This line of discourse suggests that people should trust his judgment once again and helps him fulfill the external criteria of successful securitization by gaining authority. Therefore, his judgment to respond to calls of Russians in Crimea and not leave them in danger should be considered legitimate, otherwise, Russia could be considered a traitor.

3.4.2.8. Justification of legitimacy of extraordinary measures

Since the point of the securitization is to convince the audience that something is existentially threatened and requires an implementation of an extraordinary measure to protect it we need to look at one such measure to see how Putin justified the annexation of Crimea post-implementation. This oversight may help analyze the response to the narrative from the audience and review if something similar would be possible in the case of the war in Donbas.

Putin uses three narrative justifications for the Crimean annexation, including the legitimacy of the Referendum, no apparent violation of international norms, and the presence of the Russian military for the sole purpose of peaceful voting without interference.

Putin states that the point of departure for the population of Crimea to organize a Referendum and protect their culture, language, and history was the unconstitutional overtaking of power in Kyiv and the unpredictability of the unfolding situation. Putin states that the preliminary decision to provide support to the Crimean people was an overview of the anonymous sociological polls conducted in Crimea, indicating that around 80% of the population would prefer unification with Russia and the votes of the Referendum suggest that the actual percentage was closer to 93-97%. This, in the discourse of Putin, clearly suggests that the decision to reunify Crimea with Russia was solely decided by the people in Crimea, and the Russian Federation has only provided the platform for this decision.

Moreover, Putin reminds the audience that the High Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the Charter of the United Nations when proclaiming self-determination, that according to discourse was completely in line with international law. Moreover, Putin states that the same charter has been referred to during the self-determination of Ukraine during withdrawal from USSR or invoked by Kosovo Albanians, whose decision was taken by the Parliament. This, in the discourse, suggests the injustice of the international law systems that in one case allow the countries to use its right to self-determination but denies it in the case of Crimeans and attempts to convince the audience that the sanctions imposed by Russia are nothing but a punitive mechanism once again designed to destabilize Russia for the crime it did not commit (Putin, 2014l). Additionally, Putin notes that the decision to accept Crimea as a new subject of the Russian Federation was supported by deputies of all fractions in the State Duma, which have based their decision on the Constitution of Russia and international law. These mentions of discourse aimed at the general population of Russia, who are unlikely to fact-check the claims in the speech and more likely to believe the discourse by word.

Lastly, the Russian government initially denied the presence of any troops in Ukraine at the time of the Crimea Referendum, however later admitted that the troops were indeed present, but served the sole purpose of ensuring peaceful voting. Putin states that there was no direct order to send the troops to the Crimean Peninsula, there were only the ones that were already legally there (Referring to Black Sea Fleet), and later on, that special forces and armed forces were indeed present (Putin, 2014l, 2015p). However, Putin states that the mission of the troops was solely the provision of circumstances under which people could freely express their opinion and will, and without the position of Crimeans themselves it would not have been possible. By noting that there was no annexation of the Peninsula, but publicly admitting that there were troops to protect freedom of speech and decisions, the discourse attempts to justify the peaceful mission of Russia in Ukraine and attempts to make amends for possible ‘misunderstanding’ that the audience might have had prior.

3.5 Analysis of audience acceptance of securitization attempt

Through the analysis of opinion polls from Levada-Center concerning audience response to the securitization of Pan-Slavic identity in Ukraine, it has become clear that the securitizing has been extremely successful concerning the identities of people on Crimea Peninsula.

The analysis revealed that the most successful category measuring the response included the vilification discourse of the West. The audience seems to have embraced the notion of hostilities between the West and Russia, specifically the United States, which is suggested by the significant fall in the positive attitude of Russians to the USA from January to September 2014. The attitudes fell from people indicating their attitude were mostly good (41%) in January to only 16% for the same category in September, and very bad (8%) in January to almost 30% in September. The same trend can be seen when people responded to the characterization of the USA, with most respondents (42%) indicating the relationship to be normal/calm in October 2013, and hostile (39%) and tense (43%) in September 2014 (Levada-Center, 2014k, 2014q). We need to note that even though the relationships between the two countries were never too friendly, the dramatic slump in the positive attitude correlates with the most intense vilification discourse of Putin conducted in Spring/Summer 2014 and the possible impact of the West's sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in July and September 2014, possibly impacting public attitudes. At the same time, 59% of the Russian population in 2015 indicated that the USA probably or definitely posed a threat to Russia, with majority population indicating that it does so by mostly creating obstacles to Russia's development, establishing control over Russian economy and imposing foreign ideals and values in Russia (Levada-Center, 2015i). These responses indicate that the discourse concerning threats to identity by Western ideals has been successful, however, the impact of sanctions and the discourse on limitation of ability to preserve oneself as a nation has been even more useful. This may be the case, since the latter has been used in the Russian political discourse for a longer period and have already been ingrained in the minds of people, making it easier to securitize. At the same time, Russian population does not have a preference to personalities of leaders in the West, but rather the impact of their policies on Russia – this can be seen in the opinion poll, which indicated that Russian population believed the policies of Barack Obama stayed the same as previous administration's in June 2014 (before the implementation of sanctions)(57%) and significantly worsened (36%) in October 2014 (Levada-Center, 2014z). The sharp rise (35%) in respondents indicating that the situation has worsened suggested that Putin is successful in putting all the situations and issues regarding the West under one umbrella to establish one big threat. At the same time, attitudes towards European Union have also taken a slump from January to September 2014, with 50 % of respondents indicating the relationship was mostly good in January to 45% indicating it was mostly bad in September (Levada-Center, 2014k).

The same downwards trend can be seen in a relationship shifting from being normal/calm to tense. In the case of European Union, the dump in the perception of relations was less prominent than in the case of USA, indicating the impact of discourse, that suggests EU changes its attitudes to Russia out of necessity, due to political pressure of USA, but nevertheless harms Russian population due to sanctions. Moreover, the polls suggest that Russians believe that the most important Western countries, such as the USA, Germany, and Great Britain are Russian opponents strive to solve their problems at Russia's expense and when possible damage their interest as well as suppress Russia and weaken its influence in the world. The increase in this attitude can be seen as in a 35% jump of the given attitude from 2010 to 2014, the largest increase in the given opinion since the collapse of the USSR (Levada-Center, 2014q). This statistic indicated the success of the discourse of Putin on externalizing threats regarding Ukraine, mentioning that the West is on the mission to damage Russia for its desire to preserve itself as a civilization. Another important statistic concerns the information warfare between Russia and the West, which indicates that sort of media is used and trusted by the Russian audience and is crucial in understanding what sort of discourse is most prominent. In November 2014 46% of respondents indicated that they sometimes read/watch the information that contains a point of view on Ukraine that is very different from Russian TV and Federal Media, while 37% indicated that they never do so. Out of those, who do not consult any other alternative information, most respondents indicated that the reasons behind this include belief that an alternative point of view is anti-Russian propaganda (26%) or the information is far from the truth (17%). Moreover, some respondents indicated that they are not able to find alternative sources (13%) or are not particularly interested in the events in Ukraine (20%). At the same time poll, respondents overwhelmingly suggested that Russia itself does not conduct information warfare against Ukraine and gives an objective picture of events (59%) or agree that it does, but it is justified in the light of the situation (13%) (Levada-Center, 2014i). These polls indicate that Putin is extremely successful at capturing the audience with a stable stream of securitization discourse, therefore penetrating most of the population perception, at the same time creating the enemy out of Ukraine and the West. Concerning Western pressure on Russia with the economic sanctions, the majority of Russians believe that Russian Federation is justified in its actions, with 68% of respondents stating that Russia should not give in to the Western demands to limit its support in LPR and DPR or militiamen in Eastern Ukraine (Levada-Center, 2014w). Moreover, there is a notable slump in the desire of Russian people to expand

economic, political ties with the West (19% decrease from 2000 to 2014) and believe that Russia needs to curtail the ties and alienate itself from the West (16% increase from 2000 to 2014) (Levada Center, 2014q). Out of these numbers, most people indicate that the hostile regime should be more prominent concerning the USA and less prominent concerning the EU. Concerning the hostilities in Donetsk and the subsequent attitude, the polls indicate that the feelings of compassion and brotherly help establish the audience's support for the military support for Donbas, while the vilification discourse and impact of sanctions on Russian domestic situation allows for the increase in isolationist attitudes. Lastly, the majority of the audience believes that the west's reaction to the events in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea are a direct impact of West's pursuit to take advantage of the situation to exert pressure on Russia (58%) and 18% suggesting this is the outcome of a lack of understanding of what is really happening in Ukraine. At the same time, respondents believe in the strong response to the West's economic pressure, by stating that Russia should continue its own policies, disregarding sanctions (72%), compensate for the sanctions by transferring the burden on foreign companies or states that benefited from the sanctions against Russian companies (60%) and supporting the idea of boycotting goods purchased abroad, such as a ban on Western food imports (58%) (Levada-Center, 2015j, 2014n). The strong support for the measure can be connected to the discourse of Putin, blaming the NGO's functioning of foreign investments and 'foreign agents' for the overturn of the power in Kyiv as well as increasing the levels of national pride by using language techniques that construct the 'self'.

We have preliminarily established that the securitization discourse concerning identities of people on the Crimean Peninsula has been successful since the extraordinary measure of the annexation has occurred. Here we will establish in which areas the discourse has allowed for the audience acceptance for the major part. Polls show that the audience considers the beginning of the present crisis in Ukraine as the moment Euromaidan began (60%) and the moment Viktor Yanukovich was removed from the power (18%), which corresponds to the direction securitization discourse took (Levada-Center, 2014f). Moreover, the polls show that Russians do not consider Ukraine to be a foreign country, coinciding with the suggestion of Vladimir Putin that Ukrainian people are fraternal brothers that share the same history, culture, and fate. The numbers in the poll do not seem to correlate throughout the course indicating that this attitude is consistent in the audience, which allows for a more successful of securitization. Generally, the audience feels very good or mostly good about Ukrainian people themselves, with 81% of respondents sharing this

attitude in 2006 and 64% in 2015 (Levada-Center, 2015f). Here we see that the slight decline in the positive perception of the people has been consistent over the years and does not directly respond to the time of securitization. This can be explained by the fact, that the securitization discourse was based on the vilification of specific groups, such as nationalists, Russophobes, and anti-Semites, as well as West and the Ukrainian government, and not the general population itself. On the contrary, Putin states that as fraternal nations, Russians and Ukrainians should keep up the good neighborly relations and come to each other's help in the moments of need. Since Russian State frequently uses cultural construction of identity through the media and films with elements of propaganda, we can note that these tactics are proved to be successful on most occasions, such as films that were released at the time of securitization discourse – “Crimea. The Path to Motherland” and “The President”. Since these films attempt to solidify the discourse of historical similarity of paths taken by East of Ukraine and establish a cult of personality, we can analyze their impact on audience response to the discourse. Of those who have watched the films, 89% of respondents stated that they liked the film about Crimea and 85% about the President, suggesting that the discourse has been accepted (Levada-Center, 2015z). Before the annexation of the Crimea but already at the start of securitizing discourse, audience responses suggested that most of the people want Crimea to be a part of Russia (64%) and only 11% stated that it needs to be independent, once again indicative of the success of the discourse on the cultural, language and unity of identity (Levada-Center, 2014d). Over the course of 2014 and 2015 similar trend can be seen on the support of the accession of Crimea to Russia, with a whopping majority (89% of respondents) supporting the measure with a slight dip in 2015, which once again can be explained by the pressure exerted on Russia as a retaliatory measure. It is important to note that those, who responded in favor of annexation, state that the unification is a correct measure since Crimea is considered Russian Land (74%), because otherwise Crimean people could have been subjected to the violence by Ukrainian right-wing radicals (36%), and because otherwise, Crimea would have been forcibly Ukrainianized (16%) (Levada-Center, 2014d). According to this, we can conclude, that the narrative on the historical unity and identity has been the most successful tool in convincing the audience of the existential threat, followed by the discourse containing vilification and threat of nationalism. We might suggest that the discourse of forced Ukrainian identity did not play the biggest role, as the same securitizing discourse stated that the Ukrainians and Russians by definition share the same values and cultural identity.

To understand why the securitization of narrative discourse concerning the Donbas region has not been successful, we need to understand the attitudes of the Russian population towards the region. Firstly, the discourse itself has not involved a lot of cultural references but rather focused on the threat of nationalism and the degrading economic and political situation in the region. For the population, this discourse did not involve a specific extraordinary measure to be implemented but rather suggested the patriotic desire to protect the people. Firstly, when asked about the opinion that Russia should keep its former republics under control, even by force if required, the audience showed a pretty negative attitude to the statement which was consistent throughout the years 2009 – 2014, with 66% disagreeing with the statement (Levada-Center, 2014k). This attitude underpins the difference between the audience's response to discourse on Crimea and Donbas. The discourse on Crimea involved direct references to the territorial and cultural belonging of Crimea to Russia, while Donbas was not portrayed as such to a major extent. Respondents in the poll indicated that they would want to see Eastern Ukraine become an independent state or remain as a part of Ukraine with more independence from Kyiv (24% and 21% accordingly in February 2015). Moreover, throughout the year 2014-2015, we can indicate a sharp yearly rise of 29% for the support of independence and a sharp yearly fall of 33% for the opinion that Eastern Ukraine should become a part of Russia (Levada-Center, 2015j). This change of attitude can be explained through the acceptance of the discourse, that suggests people in the region should have the right to self-determination and the feeling of compassion of the audience towards the population of Donbas, while the fall in the call for the region becoming a part of Russia fell due to increasingly worrisome situation in Russia itself due to impact of sanctions of economy, with falling oil prices, rise in food prices and domestic issues, as well as Donbas being seen as an additional burden to the economy with its failing infrastructure and possibility of extra retaliatory sanctions. In general, the attitude of the Russian population towards residents of Donetsk and Lugansk is considered friendly, with 79% of the respondents indicating that their attitude is very good or mostly good and 65% of the audience stating that Russia should recognize DPR and LPR an independent as of November 2014 (Levada-Center, 2015g, 2014f). In this instance, we see the impact of discourse on the brotherly nature of identities present in the attitudes of the respondents, regardless of the role they are playing the conflict, as people accept the notion, that they do not have any other choice but to fight. Moreover, in comparison to the situation in Crimea, the audience believes that the Kyiv authorities are fighting directly with the people of Donbas (58%), and only 18% stating that they are fighting

with Russia (Levada-Center, 2014t). The statistics in the case of Crimea seem to be reversed, as the discourse focuses the attention of the audience on the suggestion that the situation in Ukraine is a direct attack of Russian values and Russia itself. At the same time, opinion polls on the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine are indicative of the successful securitization discourse. In the speeches and addresses, Putin consistently reminds the audience, that the Russian troops are not located on the territory of Eastern Ukraine and those, who are fighting there are not financed by Russia, however, they are supported by them in terms of humanitarian support. The polls indicate that the majority (53%) of the Russian population believes that there are no Russian troops on the Ukrainian territory, which coincides with the narrative discourse (Levada-Center, 2014v). At the same time audience does indicate the belief that Russia does actively support the pro-Russian oriented forces in Ukraine, with 50% of respondents saying that the support exists. However, 20% of the respondents note that it is difficult to decide and 30% indicating that no troops are present (Levada-Center, 2014l). This statistic indicates that the confusion over the situation is present, most likely because the narrative discourse has not been pushed so aggressively and a lot of conflicting and misleading information is present. At the same time, the Russian audience indicates support for the Russian volunteer fighters in the ranks of militias in Eastern Ukraine, staying at the level of around 40% of support in 2014-2015 (Levada-Center, 2014t). Any fluctuations in the statistics can be explained by the changes in the domestic situation in Russia, and not the narrative discourse per se. Moreover, Russian audience responses suggest that the construction of 'self' and 'other' in the discourse of Putin concerning Donbas has been partially successful in creating discontent with the Ukrainian government. Polls dating autumn 2014 indicate that the Russian audience does not believe that Russia is responsible for the bloodshed and death of people in the East of Ukraine, with 73% indicating so (Levada-Center, 2014t). Moreover, the audience largely indicates that they do not believe ceasefires are observed and that there is a higher chance of renewal of military operations (55%) than the signing of a peace agreement and resolving the conflict (21%) (Levada-Center, 2014b). This attitude suggests that the audience buys into the discourse of the incompetence of the Ukrainian Government to observe the ceasefire and comply with the Minsk-2 agreement. As the timeline goes on, more people seem to be unsure of the situation in the region, indicating that it is difficult to say that is going on. One such indicator states, that 68% of the audience believe that the ceasefires are not observed on the part of Kyiv, further suggesting the success of the demonization discourse.

Another indicative statistic shows the support of the audience in the possible extraordinary measure concerning Donbas – open admittance and entrance of Russian troops on the territory. Once again, we see that the audience is reluctant to support such measures, as 60% stating that Russian troops should not intervene in the region (Levada-Center, 2014v). Moreover, the audience shows a consistent fall in the level of support the Russian government would have in the event of open military conflict, with 74% of the population possibly supporting the involvement in 2014, and only 44% possibly supporting open military conflict in 2015. At the same time when the question was rephrased as support for Russian troops fighting in the ranks of militia in Donbas, the audience showed larger support for the case (45%) in 2014, indicating that when the discourse revolved around the militia itself and the connection to the identity of people, people were more likely to accept the securitizing discourse, possibly in connection to a similar instance in Crimea (Levada-Center, 2014v). It is interesting to mention that, those who did not support the annexation of Crimea, stated that the main reasons included the subsequent destabilization of the region and the impact of sanctions, while only 19% of respondents stated that Russia might have violated international treaties and committed aggression. Moreover, the justification of the legitimacy of the extraordinary measures has been taken well by the audience, as polls indicate that 52% of respondents believe that the Referendum was conducted solely by the Crimean people and 79% stating that Russia did not annex Crimea with the use of military force, which convinces with the narrative of Putin. However, 34% of respondents also stated that Russian authorities were indeed behind the organization of the Referendum (Levada-Center, 2014d, 2014u). This statistic can be related to the inconsistency of the discourse concerning the presence of the military on the peninsula at the time of the Referendum, the sheer amount of polemics, and the force of the discourse on the topic and general mistrust of portions of the population in the government. Here it is important to note that directly before the annexation of Crimea, the electoral ratings as well as levels of trust and support for the securitizing actor – Vladimir Putin – were historically low. This combined with the general mistrust in the local and regional authorities as well as members of the State Duma might have played the role in the low levels of trust in the basis of discourse. On the other hand, we can see that the audience still considered the annexation of Crimea as a correct step even a year after the event, with 70% of the respondents stating that the decision brought more good and was willing to some extent pay the burden of the investment in the region after its annexation (59% in March 2014 & 50% in August 2014) (Levada -Center, 2015j, 2014n). The

slight fall in the opinion may be a result of the early effects of the economic sanction and the pressure on Russia economically and politically. When asked about the most memorable events of 2014, audience named imposing of sanctions, the collapse of the ruble, continued decline of the oil prices, ban on import of goods from the West as the main negative events and voted them at the same priority as the Referendum of the accession of Crimea, “anti-terror operation” in the East of Ukraine and the change of power in Ukraine. This indicates that the pressure exerted on Russia economically may have played a big role in the attitudes of the audience concerning the Donbas region, which has followed the introduction of sanctions and discouraged the acceptance of the narrative.

Lastly, the securitization discourse both in the case of Donbas and Crimea attempted to construct a sense of identity and ‘self’ to unite the audience against the common enemy. It is especially important to note that securitization has directly impacted the levels of national pride and patriotism which were crucial for the acceptance of the discourse. Generally speaking, the majority of Russians state that they are proud to live in Russia. Here we can note that the percentage of those who have voted as being proud has increased from 70% to 86% in just one year from 2013 to 2014, which is the largest jump in the opinion since the golden era of Putin in the late 2000s (Levada-Center, 2014m). At the same time the opinions on what kind of country the audience wants Russia to be, the opinion is almost equally divided between wanting to see Russia as a powerful country that is respected and feared by other countries and a country with high living standards, even if it is not one of the most powerful countries in the world. Even though throughout the time of securitization discourse we can notice a slight increase in the preference of the former, half of the population still prefers to have high living standards. This statistic is important in the context of the securitization discourse, as the annexation of Crimea have brought about a larger burden of Russia’s economy, without even mentioning economic sanctions. And since the burden would be put on the shoulders of the general population through the taxation system and most of the social sphere improvements would be directed at the Crimean peninsula, many people would reconsider the acceptance of securitization discourse in the case of Donbas. Another poll from Levada suggests an extra reason for the success of securitization discourse, which shows that Russian people overwhelmingly consider the best qualities of their nation to be ‘ready to come to one’s aid’(47%), ‘hospitable’ (48%) and ‘patient’ (44%). These exact qualities are being exploited in the securitization discourse, by stating that helping Crimea out in the time of need is the sacred

duty of the Russian people, therefore putting honey on people's positive perception of self with the language in the discourse. At the same time, with the use of colloquial references, Putin asserts that Russia has always been patient with its Western allies, however, enough is enough. This message strongly resonates with the audience, which allows for further success of the discourse.

Conclusion

Through the preliminary investigation of the background, we have established that the main perceived threats to Russian Federation include a threat to industrial security of regions close to Ukrainian border; a threat to the established value system and domestic political security by liberalization and westernization imported in Russia's sphere of influence, a threat to territorial integrity posed by a perceived expansionist attitude of EU and NATO; a threat to economic stability by uncertainty in the energy market and potential export partners; a threat to geopolitical and military regional influence by uncertain partnership agreements and a threat to political influence in the region through voluntary acceptance of different values by perceived allies. The combination of these threats prompts Russian authorities to utilize securitization discourse, as such threats are too controversial for discussion within the normal scope of politics.

In the analysis of the securitization corpora, we have discovered that the securitization discourse in the context of Russo-Ukrainian conflict has been constructed through the use of the statements of the illegitimacy of Ukrainian government due to the interference from the Western forces through the system of NGO's and foreign channels of their financing. The discourse attempts to demonize the interim and newly elected governments of Ukraine, by stating that they are controlled externally as well as ridden by radicalized individuals, such as ultranationalists, fascists, Russophobes, and anti-Semites that threaten the identities of the predominantly Russian-speaking population on the Crimean Peninsula and Donbas. Moreover, the discourse presents the alleged Western interference, such as the expansion of NATO and EU, as the existential threat to the securitized identity not only through the obvious threats of military and trade expansion but through the liberalization/radicalization as well as the possibility of organization of artificial 'color revolutions' to capture the market and impose one's values and ideals on the people, whose opinion would not matter. Moreover, discourse predominantly uses the threat of nationalism, which is narrated through the historical references to WWII and historical memories that construct securitized identities. The threat, in this case, comes to the radicalization of the people, whose identities need to be protected, as they would not have another choice but to stand up for themselves since the government or international organizations are incapable of resolving the conflicts justly and swiftly. Additionally, discourse securitizes language, which is perceived to be threatened by the nationalistic and ignorant regional language policies of Ukraine, that attempt to discriminate against the minority groups, especially those with the Russian language as mother

tongue. At the same time, discourse attempts to convince the audience that the people, whose identities are threatened by the abovementioned factors are not allowed to have their voices heard or represent themselves, such as in the case of Donbas. The combination of the abovementioned factors allows Russian Federation to create a pretext for the annexation of Crimea and military involvement in Donbas, based on the martyrdom and duty to protect those with the same historical past, values, culture, language, and identity.

The audience response analysis indicates that the most successful tactics of Vladimir Putin in securitizing discourse revolved around the narration of the territorial, historical, cultural, language and moral unity of identities of people in the East of Ukraine as well as demonization of the West and Ukrainian government in the discourse, stating that they are infringing on or ignoring the rights of the population, whose identities need to be protected. In the case of Crimea, the securitization discourse has been successful in the instances of the audience accepting the historical unity of the peoples as well as the threat to their desire for self-preservation. The only instance, in which the securitization has not been successful was convincing the audience, that the Russian government has not been behind the Referendum for the accession of Crimea. The failure in convincing audience may be related to the inconsistency of the discourse concerning the presence of the military on the Peninsula at the time of the Referendum, the sheer amount of polemics, and the force of the discourse on the topic and general mistrust of portions of the population in the government. Here it is important to note that directly before the annexation of Crimea, the electoral ratings as well as levels of trust and support for the securitizing actor – Vladimir Putin – were historically low. This combined with the general mistrust in the local and regional authorities as well as members of the State Duma might have played the role in the low levels of trust in the basis of discourse. In the case of Donbas, however, securitization discourse has been less successful due to factors including the absence of concrete proposed extraordinary measure to which the audience could react, the diminished use of cultural similarities in the securitizing discourse, as well as reluctance of the audience to approve of supporting DPR and LPR due to domestic issues stemming from the impact of economic sanctions on Russia, falling oil prices, the collapse of the ruble, inconsistency of securitizing discourse, fear of destabilization in the region as well as the possibility of further retaliatory measures by the West.

Resume

Od rozpadu Sovietskeho Zväzu v roku 1991 a následného vytvorenia nových nezávislých štátov je Ruská Federácia stále podozrievaná zapájaním sa do expanzívnej zahraničnej politiky zameranej na opätovné získanie pôvodného územia a vplyvu. Jedným z príkladov, ktorý tento názor zosilnilo, bola anexia Krymského polostrova Ruskou Federáciou v období od Februára do Marca 2014 a následný ozbrojený konflikt v oblasti Donbasu na východnej Ukrajine. V priebehu konfliktu sa Ruská Federácia zapojila do sekuritizačného diskurzu týkajúceho sa totožnosti obyvateľstva vo vyššie uvedených regiónoch. Máme podozrenie, že diskurza identity bola jednou z najúčinnějších taktík, ktoré mali ruské orgány uplatniť, pretože umožňoval mimoriadnej miery anexie Krymu, ktorá sa realizovalo s podporou obyvateľov Ruskej Federácie. Ozbrojený konflikt v regióne Donbasu však pokračuje dodnes a zostáva nejasné, či je sekuritizačný diskurz vedený ruskými orgánmi viac-menej účinný v porovnaní s tým, ktorý sa používa na Kryme. Tento výskum bude analyzovať efektívnosť sekuritizačného diskurzu týkajúceho sa identity obyvateľov Krymu a Donbasu a pokúsi sa ustanoviť hlavné oblasti hrozby vnímané Ruska ktoré viedli sekuritizácii, ako aj najúspešnejšie spôsoby, ako to môže urobiť v rámci diskurzu identity. Pri výskume sa využije teoretický rámec sekuritizácie Barryho Buzana na stanovenie definícií, aktérov a sektorov analýzy, ako aj analýzy diskurzu, ktorá poskytuje metodiku analýzy dokumentov obsahujúcich sekuritizačné akty a reakcie publika. Kombinácia týchto dvoch rámcov pomôže dokázať naše hypotézy:

1. Medzi hlavné vnímané hrozby pre Ruskú Federáciu patrí ohrozenie priemyselnej bezpečnosti regiónov blízko ukrajinských hraníc; hrozba pre etablovaných hodnotový systém a domáca politická bezpečnosť liberalizáciou a westernizáciou dovážanou do sféry vplyvu Ruska, a hrozba územnej celistvosti ktorú predstavuje vnímaný expanzívny postoj EÚ a NATO; ohrozenie

hospodárskej stability neistotou na trhu s energiou a potenciálnymi vývoznými partnermi; hrozba pre geopolitické a vojenský regionálny vplyv neistými dohodami o partnerstve a ohrozenie politického vplyvu v regióne prostredníctvom dobrovoľného prijatia rôznych hodnôt vnímanými spojencami. Kombinácia týchto hrozieb podnecuje ruské orgány, aby využívali sekuritizačný diskurz, pretože takéto hrozby sú príliš kontroverzné na diskusiu rámci normálneho rozsahu politiky.

2. Medzi najúspešnejšie taktiky používané rámci sekuritizačného diskurzu patrí oživenie jazyka používaného v druhej svetovej vojne na démonizáciu dočasnej vlády Ukrajiny a vykreslenie sebaurčenia ľudí na Kryme, aby sa oddelili alebo boli „spasení“ od Ukrajiny a rozprávali o historických vzťahoch Krymu s Ruskom.

3. Sekuritizácia diskurzu identity týkajúca sa Krymu je úspešná a účinná z dôvodu massívneho súhlasu publika voči mimoriadnej miery anexie a poskytnuté odôvodnenie za súhlasom, ktoré zahrná väčšinu prvkov použité v sekuritizačnom diskurze. Sekuritizácia diskurzu identity týkajúca sa Donbasu je menej úspešná a účinná z dôvodu absencie konkrétneho mimoriadných opatrení v sekuritizačnom diskurze, ako aj z dôvodu nespokojnosti publikum s ruskými orgánmi ako sekuritizujúce subjekty v dôsledku hospodárskej krízy spôsobenej zavedením západných sankcií, kolaps rubel'a a klesajúce ceny ropy.

Zistenia tohto výskumu môžu pomôcť pri budúcom skúmaní príbehov o identite v rámci politického diskurzu a identifikovať taktiku, ktorú Ruská federácia používa na sekuritizáciu identity v krajinách SNŠ.

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Appendix 1

Example of collocates for the word 'reunification' (воссоединение) in Sketch Engine

воссоединение as noun 15× Sorted by frequency ×

prepositional		
после	2	8.48
после воссоединения		
за	2	5.7
за воссоединение с Россией		
против	1	8.22
против воссоединения		
по	1	3.33
по воссоединению		

object4_of		
произойти	2	12.29
Произошло воссоединение		
состояться	1	12.19
состоялось воссоединение		
поддержать	1	10.54
поддержали воссоединение		
поддерживать	1	8.46
поддерживают воссоединение		

a_modifier		
исторический	1	8.69
историческое воссоединение		

a_modifier		
исторический	1	8.69
историческое воссоединение		

gen_modifies		
момент	1	10.35
момента воссоединения		

gen_modifier		
крым	8	10.91
воссоединения Крыма		
республика	1	8.65
воссоединение Республики		

pp_obj_za		
высказаться	1	12.68
высказалось за воссоединение		

pp_c		
россия	3	11.12
за воссоединение с Россией		



Appendix 2

Example of securitization coding in MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020

The screenshot displays the MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020 interface. On the left, the 'Document System' shows a tree view of documents under 'The West', including 'Security threat', 'Reunification', 'Regionalism', 'Nationalism_Fascism', 'Liberation', 'Identity', 'Cultural unity', 'Cultural references', and 'Construction of Self'. Below it, the 'Code System' shows a tree view of codes, including 'Cultural Unity and Reunification', 'Threat of nationalism', 'Threat to identity', 'Military threat in Donbas', 'Threat to Russian desire to be conserved as a nation', 'NATO expansion', 'Energy crisis', 'Western interference with Ukrainian politics', 'Trade', 'United nations', and 'Sets'. The main window, 'Document Browser: The West (Page 1/29)', shows a document titled 'Threat of nationalism' with a vertical timeline on the left indicating code placement for 'Threat to identity', 'United nations', 'NATO expansion', and 'Western interference wi'. The document text on the right discusses the export of 'democratic' revolutions and mentions the 70th session of the UN General Assembly.

Code: Cultural Unity and Reunification

Должна быть в полном объеме проведена работа по реабилитации репрессированных народов и, что, на мой взгляд, крайне важно, обеспечено реальное равноправие трёх языков: русского, украинского и крымско-татарского. Сохранение, развитие национальных культур и традиций всех живущих здесь народов – чрезвычайно важная задача. Обращаясь к истории, хочу отметить следующее: Крым действительно занимает особое место в истории нашей страны, нашего Отечества. Крымская земля помнит и наши триумфы, и наши победы, но помнит и трагедию братоубийственной Гражданской войны, долгие беды. Здесь, в Перекопе, ослепленные взаимной ненавистью, один русский солдат убивал другого русского солдата, когда в ноябре 1920 года более 150 тысяч наших соотечественников были вынуждены покинуть Родину

Document: Встреча с членами фракций Tags: Nationalism/Fascism, Cultural unity, Liberation, Identity

	Document name	Code	Beginning	End	We... Preview	Coverage %
<input type="radio"/>	Reunification	Cultural Unity and...	1: 36	1: 914	0 И эти люди принесли любовь к Отечеству через поколения. Это, б	15.15
<input type="radio"/>	Reunification	Cultural Unity and...	4: 575	4: 860	0 Возвращение донной Крыма стало знаком судьбы, символом нового е	4.93
<input type="radio"/>	Nationalism_Fasci...	Cultural Unity and...	1: 1428	0	0 Хочу отдельно отметить, что в эти дни будет ещё один праздник,	6.85
<input checked="" type="radio"/>	Nationalism_Fasci...	Cultural Unity and...	2: 1407	3: 689	0 Должна быть в полном объёме проведена работа по реабилитации р	7.11
<input type="radio"/>	Nationalism_Fasci...	Cultural Unity and...	3: 691	3: 1569	0 И эти люди принесли любовь к Отечеству через поколения. Это, б	7.09
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	1: 286	1: 638	0 Кстати, хотелось бы, что Вы передали народу Крыма тоже нашу ог	1.27
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	1: 1368	2: 141	0 Должен сказать, вот присоединён Крым: присоединена не только те	1.31
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	5: 422	5: 684	0 В 2014 году также вместе отметили 70-летие освобождения Севасто	0.94
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	10: 1519	10: 1768	0 Я уже упомянул о единых исторических нравственно-духовных корн	0.90
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	11: 186	11: 900	0 Вы знаете, что бы ни происходило и куда бы Украина ни шла, мы в	2.56
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	11: 1249	11: 1444	0 важные представители Республики Крым и Севастополя – они зде	0.70
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	11: 1446	12: 248	0 В Крыму – могилы русских солдат, мужеством которых Крым в 1783	1.61
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	12: 628	12: 911	0 Мы с уважением относимся к представителям всех национальностей,	1.02
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	12: 979	12: 1408	0 В сердце, в сознании людей Крым всегда был и остаётся неотъемл	1.54
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	12: 1410	13: 72	0 Но люди не могли смириться с вопиющей исторической несправедлив	1.09
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	13: 74	13: 283	0 А отношения с Украиной, с братским украинским народом были и ос	0.75
<input type="radio"/>	Identity	Cultural Unity and...	16: 1732	17: 202	0	2.12

Danilova-Cross: Securitization of identity

Navigation

Search document

Headings Pages Results

- Language discrimination
- Violation of international norms.
- Illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government and interf...
- Protection from the violent regime
- Threat of Nationalism
- Trade and Energy Blockade
- Threat to preservation of national ideals
- Illegitimacy of International Organizations
- NATO Expansion
- Duty to protect
- Situation in Donbas
- Justification of legitimacy
 - Legitimate Referendum
 - No violation of international norms
 - Presence of Russian Military**
 - What else needs to be done?

Presence of Russian Military

Вооружённые Силы России не входили в Крым, они там уже и так находились в соответствии с международным договором
Document: Обращение Президента РФ Tags: Liberation

Вас поздравляю с тем, что Вы сегодня честно сказали, что «зелёные человечки» – это мирные наши военные, которые защищали русских людей. Это очень важно – публично говорить о таких вещах, чтобы не было потом спекуляций нигде
Document: Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным (2) Tags: Liberation

Много раз говорил, но воспользуюсь Вашим выступлением и вопросом, для того чтобы сказать, что, конечно, никакой аннексии Крыма не было и нет. Мы действительно использовали наши Вооружённые Силы, но только для того, чтобы дать возможность людям, которые проживают на этих территориях, высказать своё мнение о своём будущем. Может быть, вообще это впервые, впервые здесь проведён такой полноценный плебисцит, полноценный референдум по жизненно важному, судьбоносному вопросу для людей, которые проживают на этой территории.
Document: Встреча с членами фракций Tags: Reunification, Liberation

Россия создала условия, с помощью, конечно, специальных формирований и Вооружённых Сил, япрямо скажу, но создала только условия для свободного волеизъявления людей, которые проживают в Крыму и Севастополе. А решение о присоединении приняли сами люди. Россия откликнулась на этот призыв и приняла Крым и Севастополь в свою семью. Это естественно, по-другому и быть не могло.
Document: Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным (2) Tags: Liberation

Наша задача заключалась в том, чтобы обеспечить безопасность граждан и благоприятные условия для их волеизъявления. Мы это и сделали. Но без позиции самих крымчан это было бы просто невозможно.
Document: Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным (2) Tags: Liberation, Security threat

Прежде всего хочу сказать, что члены Совета Федерации, как Вы знаете, единодушно поддержали воссоединение Крыма с Россией. Вашу позицию по защите наших соотечественников в Украине. По-другому, мы считаем, уважающее себя государство поступить просто не могло.
Document: Встреча с членами Совета палаты Tags: Liberation, Construction of Self

Navigation

Search document

Headings Pages Results

- What is considered identity that needs to be protected?
 - Historical identity (territorial)
 - Historical (military)
 - Historical identity (language and cultural)
 - Historical (religion)
- Why did Russia feel like it needed to interfere?
 - Language discrimination
 - Violation of international norms.
 - Illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government and interf...**
 - Protection from the violent regime
 - Threat of Nationalism
 - Trade and Energy Blockade
 - Threat to preservation of national ideals
 - Illegitimacy of International Organizations
 - NATO Expansion
 - Duty to protect

Вместо того чтобы продолжать с нами этот спор легитимными, дипломатическими средствами, наши европейские друзья и друзья из Соединённых Штатов поддержали антиконституционный вооружённый захват власти. Вот что произошло. Мы не создавали этого кризиса, мы были противниками такого развития событий, но после того как произошёл антиконституционный переворот... Надо это признать, в конце концов...
Document: Интервью Владимира Путина радио Tags: The West, Security threat

Наши партнёры в Соединённых Штатах не скрывают, что поддерживали тех, кто выступал против Президента Янукович . Некоторые прямо сказали, что чуть ли не несколько миллиардов [на это] истратили.

Ч.Роуз: Вы считаете, что Соединённые Штаты связаны со свержением Виктора Януковича, когда он был вынужден бежать в Россию?

В.Путин: Я знаю об этом точно.
Document: Интервью американскому журналисту Tags: The West, Security threat

В Страсбурге нам лицемерно говорили про демократию и международное право, а натовские самолёты в это же самое время бомбили Белград, Багдад, Триполи. Нам твердили про права человека, но не нашлось никого, кто бы решительно осудил бесчинства и криминальный беспредел в отношении русских. Нам рассказывали про верховенство закона и невмешательство во внутренние дела, а сами снабжали деньгами и оружием бандитов, выступали на митингах против легитимной власти, «подогревали» радикалов и при этом театрально раздавали там леченье.
Document: Встреча с членами Совета палаты Tags: Nationalism/Fascism, The West

Appendix 3

Example of audience response coding in MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020

The screenshot displays the MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020 interface. On the left, the 'Document System' and 'Code System' are visible. The 'Code System' includes categories like 'The West', vilification discourse' and 'Military actions involving Russia in Eastern Ukraine'. The main window shows a document titled 'Levada-Center » Russian participation in th...' with two survey results tables.

Survey 1: DO YOU THINK AN INFORMATION WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY...

Definitely not	24
It is difficult to say	12

Survey 2: DO YOU THINK THAT RUSSIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BLOODSHED AND DEATH OF PEOPLE IN EASTERN UKRAINE?

	Oct. 14			
	Ukraine?	USA, Western countries?		
Definitely yes	54	55		
Mostly yes	29	33		
Mostly no	5	3		
Definitely not	3	1		
It is difficult to say	9	9		

Code: Military actions involving Russia in Eastern Ukraine 27 coded segments (from 11 documents, 0 document groups)

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN EASTERN UKRAINE WOULD YOU PREFER?

	Nov. 14
That Ukraine independently resolved problems with eastern oblasts	36
That a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine was achieved through the mediation of Russia	36
That Russia until the end helped the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics achieve independence from Ukraine by any means, including military	16
It is difficult to say	12

Document name	Code	Beginning	End	We...	Preview
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	2: 26 79	3: 445 605	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	3: 25 251	3: 533 455	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » I...	Military actions in...	5: 31 491	5: 578 762	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » L...	Military actions in...	1: 37 214	1: 582 554	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	1: 22 173	1: 574 384	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	1: 33 167	2: 561 699	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » I...	Military actions in...	2: 26 181	2: 574 412	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » I...	Military actions in...	2: 33 181	3: 578 730	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » I...	Military actions in...	3: 38 508	3: 573 731	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » L...	Military actions in...	1: 29 161	2: 590 565	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » L...	Military actions in...	2: 29 28	2: 574 336	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » L...	Military actions in...	3: 23 561	3: 530 768	0	<IMAGE>
LECE33~1	Military actions in...	2: 38 325	2: 577 575	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	1: 37 374	1: 511 554	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	1: 34 192	1: 463 370	0	<IMAGE>
Levada-Center » ...	Military actions in...	1: 36 41	1: 387 190	0	<IMAGE>